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Summary 
This master thesis in public administration focuses on the political system of 
Lebanon; its history, institutions and the effect thereof on current political 
contestation. The problem-formulation reads: 
How have the Lebanese citizens historically been articulated as religious subjects, 
and how does the subsequent political system limit the scope for political 
contestation? 
The thesis focuses on the political system‟s internal logic of how citizens should 
be represented politically. The empirical data is split between a historical and a 
present perspective – the division being before and after the Ta‟if Agreement.  
The historical perspective includes the four constitutional developments of 1) The 
Réglement Organique of 1861 2) The first constitution of Grand Liban 1926 3) 
The constitution of independent Lebanon and the parallel National Pact of 1943 4) 
The Ta‟if Agreement of 1989, and the constitutional amendments according to it 
in 1991. Through a method of problematization five different discursive identities 
are identified each offering their own problematization of Lebanon. The object of 
analysis is then how the interplay between these identities has constructed a 
particular logic of representation, based on the primacy of the religious subject. 
The present perspective looks at the electoral reform that was initiated in 2005, 
and ended with the adoption of a new electoral law in 2008 – as part of the Doha 
Agreement. Further, it looks at the rhetoric during the political parties‟ campaigns 
before the 2009 election. Lastly, different examples of civil society contestations 
are included. The object of analysis is the processes of maintenance and 
contestation of the historically instituted logic of representation. 
The theory applied is Laclau and Mouffe‟s discourse theory, based on ‟Hegemony 
and Socialist Strategy‟ (1985). Further, the analytical strategy is inspired by 
Glynos and Howarth‟s „Logics of Critical Explanation in Social and Political 
Theory‟ (2007).  
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The main conclusion of the paper is that the establishment of Lebanon as a state 
where the Christian community had special privileges is crucial for an 
understanding of the political system today. The religious subjectivity of the 
citizens has been instituted through a historical process, which began with a 
perceived primacy of the Christian subject. Second, political contestation today is 
set in narrow frames because all politicians represent specific religious 
communities, thereby excluding the secular subject from politics.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Total number of characters: 196.623 
Picture on front-page is from the homepage of amam05: 
http://www.05amam.org/projects_sects_press.html  
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1. Introduction  
1.1. Introduction to the topic 
Since Lebanon gained independence from France in 1943, and even since 1926 
when its first constitution was drawn up, the Lebanese state has been constructed 
around its different religious groups. Sunni Muslims, Shiite Muslims and 
Maronite Christians are the three biggest denominations, but 11 different 
confessional groups
1
 are guaranteed representation in Parliament. This power-
sharing system is based on both formal and customary practices – and at times the 
distinction between the two is blurred. Although the Ta‟if Agreement which 
ended the civil war stated abolishment of sectarianism as a national goal, sectarian 
customary practices continue to dominate Lebanese politics - and have to some 
degree been even further institutionalized. (Samuels 2006:4) 
Due to the institutional set-up, state and sectarianism are odd but faithful 
companions in Lebanon. The power-structures (based on the elites of religious 
communities) that were installed under the Ottoman Empire and institutionalized 
under the French mandate continue to be the foundations on which political 
institutions are built. The question therefore is if sectarianism in Lebanon can be 
explained by primordial communalism in clinch with the institutions of a modern 
state. Sectarianism might rather be seen as a modern phenomenon itself; it was 
fostered by colonialism, and firmly institutionalized with the creation of the 
sovereign state of Lebanon (Makdisi 1996: 24). Thus, political institutions in 
Lebanon are not based on social practices of an original society/culture, nor are 
they detached from history.  
The main focus of interest of this paper is the shaping of political identities in 
Lebanon. Lebanon can be seen as an exemplary case of identity formation because 
religious identity for many years has been the nexus of Lebanese politics. This, at 
least, goes back to the creation of the state Lebanon that was initially justified by 
                                                             
1 There are in fact 19 different official communities in Lebanon, but only 11 are represented by 
the quota system in parliament. See appendix A for an overview of the different denominations 
of Lebanon. 
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the French colonial power as a safe haven for the Christians, to protect them from 
their Muslim neighbors. When the borders were drawn however, Lebanon ended 
up containing almost as many Muslim citizens as Christian – but still with the 
Maronite Christian church as a privileged player, as it was closely connected to 
the French Mandate which lasted  from 1920 until 1943. Since then, the Muslim 
community, particularly the Shiite, has struggled to gain an even influence on 
decision-making representative to their share of the population. (Traboulsi 2007: 
75-87) 
Today Lebanon is labeled a Consociational democracy (Lijphart 1969), and is 
based on power-sharing between 11 different minorities, grouped under the 
headlines of either Muslim or Christian. The model of consociational democracy 
represents the idea that large segments of the population can be represented in 
parliament as interest groups, to make possible elite cooperation and thereby 
overcome cultural fragmentation (Lijphart 1977; 1). The main national offices in 
Lebanon are shared between the three biggest denominations: the President is 
Maronite Christian, the Prime minister is Sunni and the speaker of the parliament 
is Shiite. Also, seats in parliament are subject to religious quota. The design of the 
Lebanese consociational democracy ensures that the religious community in most 
cases goes before the citizenship, for example people are registered as voters qua 
their religious community. This consensus-based system that was installed to 
ensure stability between the different groups seems to underscore differences. If 
one the one hand political consensus is expected in order to avoid conflict, and 
religious representation on the other hand leads to great difficulties in reaching 
political consensus, then it would appear that Lebanon has some paradoxical 
features built into its state institutions.  
 
1.2. Problem-field 
Taking its departure in discourse theory, this paper is critical to the idea that 
religious identities objectively exist per se. In turn, the paper is also critical to the 
idea that political representation should be based explicitly on religious groups, as 
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it is in Lebanon; which implies that people have fixed interests based on their 
religious confession. As Aletta Norval writes in the context of the apartheid 
regime this perspective rejects “the „ethnic conflict‟ view dominant in liberal 
discourses which tend to trace the existence of so-called „tribal‟ identities back to 
some mythical past from which these natural identities are supposed to have 
emerged” (Norval 1994; 123) That such a view is quite widespread in the 
literature about Lebanon is illustrated by the following quote from the 
introduction of Michael Hudson‟s „The Precarious Republic‟: “(…) it cannot be 
scientifically or legally ascertained whether Christians or non-Christians 
predominate in the contemporary Lebanese state, although there is an important 
myth that Christians exceed Muslims and Druzes in a ratio of six to five. It is 
difficult to name a political culture more divided along traditional lines.” (Hudson 
1968; 5) Or, Helena Cobban in the introduction to „The Making of Modern 
Lebanon‟: Even after the emergence of a „Lebanese polity‟, however, the sects 
continued to live out their own inner lives. (…)The stresses and strains of the 
years following 1975 forced most of the political parties to drop what remained of 
their „ideological‟ masks, revealing the solidly sectarian structures remaining 
underneath.”(Cobban 1985; 10-11) 
The argument in the paper is instead that the assumption of religious identities 
based on natural communal ties, on which the Lebanese political system is based, 
is shaped by historical, social and regional conditions, and that the design of the 
current electoral system and political institutions contribute to sediment and 
enforce the logic of this assumption further. How has division along sectarian 
lines in Lebanon become „objective‟ over history? Should it not be problematized 
that political representation is based on sect and denomination? Could a 
consequence of the power-sharing system be that fragmentation in Lebanon is 
rather maintained than overcome?  
The theory applied is Laclau and Mouffe‟s theory of discourse, based on 
„Hegemony and Socialist Strategy‟ (1985). This theory contributes to the overall 
argument by focusing on the interplay between the shaping of identities, and 
political practices and projects. The object of analysis is the discourse of 
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sectarianism
2
: The paper focuses exclusively on Lebanon‟s political system, more 
specifically the discourse of sectarianism that this system draws its logic from.  
The empirical frame of the paper is therefore firstly to look at historical sources 
from the points in time when Lebanese political institutions have been built; 
Lebanon‟s first constitution in 1926, the drawing of borders in the 1920s, internal 
political negotiations under the French mandate from 1920-1943 creating the 
frames of the political institutions, and the Taif Agreement from 1989 ending the 
civil war.  Secondly it looks at the recent election in 2009 and its context of newly 
electoral reform. The election is seen as interesting because it was called the most 
sectarian since the ending of the civil war (International Crisis Group 2009; EU 
2009). One of the events contributing to this assessment was the assassination of 
Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri in February 2005. Similarly, the long awaited reform 
of the election law did not introduce greater proportionality or support the further 
development of heterogeneous election districts (making sure that e.g. Sunni 
candidates would also represent Maronite or Shia votes) – it rather supported the 
contrary (DRI and LADE 2008).  
The above suggests questions such as: What is the interrelation between the state, 
its political institutions and sectarian identities? What problems could arise from 
basing democratic representation on religious quota? How is political 
contestation influenced by a power-sharing system so firmly institutionalized in 
terms of sect and denomination?  
 
1.2.1 Problem formulation 
How have the Lebanese citizens historically been articulated as religious subjects, 
and how does the subsequent political system limit the scope for political 
contestation? 
 
                                                             
2 This is inspired by Aletta J. Norvals ‘Social Ambiguity and the Crisis of Apartheid’ where the logic 
of Apartheid is investigated through looking at the discourse of Apartheid (Norval 1994; 116-
118).  
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Working questions 
The working questions specify the intention of the problem-formulation, and 
guide the analysis.   
1. How have different problematizations of Lebanon influenced the design of the 
political system, represented by the constitution and amendments to it – from the 
end of the Ottoman Empire to the ending of the civil war in 1991? 
2. How have different problematizations of Lebanon influenced the shaping of 
political identity in Lebanon? 
3. How did the 2008 electoral law and political rhetoric in the 2009 election 
contribute to a continuation of sectarianism, though the Ta‟if Agreement stated to 
abolish sectarianism? 
4. How is political representation based on sect and denomination contested?  
 
Terminology  
Confessional groups, religious affiliation, sectarianism, denominations, etc: 
Literature on Lebanon applies different terminology to describe the different 
confessional groups/minorities and the division or alliances between these.  
In this paper „sect‟ refers to Muslim and Christian as broad categories. 
„Denominations‟/‟minorities‟ refer to all 19 communities. E.g. Sunni, Shiite and 
Druze are all categorized as Muslim, but constitute their own separate religious 
communities and are represented separately in Parliament.
3
  
 
1.3 Delimitation 
Lebanon is more than most countries characterized by being placed in a complex 
regional context, where events and possible explanations hereof are connected 
across borders – and very often also connected to security policy. This is of course 
                                                             
3
 Appendix A shows the different denominations and which sect they belong to.  
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related to the fact that Lebanon is a small country situated between the rivaling 
states of Syria and Israel. This paper however is concerned with Lebanese 
domestic political questions. The relation to Syria and Israel is therefore only 
included as the context of the internal Lebanese situation, not the other way 
around as is often the case. 
The analysis focuses on the historical periods surrounding the constitutional 
developments of 1861, 1926, 1943 and 1991. This is a wide span of time, and as a 
natural consequence many events have thus been excluded from the analysis. 
Ones that could have been included as relevant based on the arguments for 
including the other constitutional developments are the first Règlement Organique 
of 1845, and the reforms during President Shihab from 1958-1964.   
The Ottomans had previously divided Mount Lebanon into Maronite and Druze 
units in 1845. Règlement Organique of 1861 is chosen as this is where Lebanon 
was first introduced as one coherent unit with sectarian representation, although 
the development towards this had started earlier. However, the paper delimits 
itself from looking into the Ottoman rationales and logics of ruling as this would 
go beyond the scope of the paper. Instead the historical starting point is the 
beginning of the French Mandate (seeing that the French informally overlapped 
with the outgoing Ottoman Empire since the Règlement of 1861). The period of 
President Shihab could be seen as a historical period of discontinuity in the 
historical trace that the analysis depicts, because Shihabism constituted a different 
form of governing compared to both before and after his rule. However, as it is 
argued that the same logic of representation was dominant both before and after 
the civil war, the period of President Shihab has been excluded due to the 
restricted time and pages available: though it would add to a more full description 
of continuity and discontinuity in the Lebanese political system, it is neither seen 
to rebut the argument of the thesis nor as central to make the argument.  
As far as possible this paper includes the 15-year civil war on the same conditions 
as the other selected historical periods. This is because the focus of this paper is 
not on the civil war as an isolated event. The civil war is not seen as a separate 
conflict to the general nature of the Lebanese political system. As is written 
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above, the argument intends to show how the dominating logic before the civil 
war, still remains today.  
Among the 17 minorities in Lebanon, the focus in the paper is primarily on Shiite, 
Sunni, Maronite and Druze, as they have been and still are the most influential 
groups. On a similar note, only the largest political parties are included in the 
analysis
4
.  
The paper applies the method of problematization as will be explained in the 
Method Chapter. Problematization is a Focauldian method, and is used isolated 
from the rest of his conceptual framework. This is because problematization is 
used as a way to operationalize the very abstract discourse theory of Laclau and 
Mouffe which is the focus as well as point of departure for the analysis.  
  
                                                             
4
 See appendix B for a listing of the political parties and the community that they are 
representative of.  
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2. Method 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter introduces the paper‟s empirical focus and sources, and 
„problematization‟ as the guiding method. The choices made are influenced by the 
choice of theory and its methodological implications – this will be dealt with more 
in depth in chapter 3, Theory and Methodology. It should introductorily be 
mentioned here that the analysis is based on Laclau and Mouffe‟s discourse 
theory. The choice of empirical sources reflects the weight that is put on 
articulations and on the historicity of the Lebanese parliamentary system. In other 
words the method of this paper is qualitative, and the analysis focuses on 
arguments and statements in a historical perspective.
 
 
 
2.2 Problematization  
The analytical strategy of problematization focuses on “not behavior or ideas, nor 
societies and their ideologies, but the problematizations through which being 
offers itself to be, necessarily, thought – and the practices on the basis of which 
these problematizations are formed” (Foucault 1985; 11).  
As the discourse theory of Laclau and Mouffe is primarily concerned with 
ontological questions, and less with methods for empirical analysis (Jørgensen 
and Phillips 1999; 34) „problematization‟ is used as the frame of analysis, based 
on Glynos and Howarth (Glynos and Howarth 2007), and inspired by David 
Campbell‟s „National Deconstruction‟ of Bosnia (Campbell 1998). 
Problematization is a Foucauldian term, but following Howarth and Glynos 
(Glynos and Howarth 2007; 167-171, 177-183) it is combinable with Laclau and 
Mouffe‟s discourse theory. 
Campbell shows how the connections between ethnicity, territoriality and identity 
in Bosnia are constructed, and thereby contingent and political rather than 
necessary. Thereby he shows how the problematization of Bosnia in terms of 
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ethnic conflict, is closely interlinked with the narratives of different Bosnias. This 
had the effect that the adopted solutions to the conflict contributed to the „ethnic‟ 
dimension of the conflict (Campbell 1998; ix-x, 13). In a similar way, this paper 
looks at how Lebanon has been problematized in terms of sectarian conflict, and 
how this has led to a political system where sectarianism determines both the 
understanding of conflicts, and solutions to these. This is related to the multiple 
identities representing different ideas of Lebanon that have influenced the design 
of the political system, and continues to do so.  
Based on the method of problematization, as described in the quote above, the 
guiding questions for the collection and reading of empirical data are: 1) how is 
political representation in Lebanon problematized, to be necessarily perceived in a 
particular way?, and 2) what are the practices on the basis of which these 
problematizations of Lebanon are formed?   
In the following section the empirical focus and sources are introduced (divided 
between the two parts of the analysis), and related to the above-mentioned 
questions.  
 
2.3 Political representation before the civil war - Empirical focus 
and sources 
The first part of the analysis is mainly based on historical sources (primary and 
secondary). The historical periods included are four constitutional developments
5
 
from the French Mandate until after the civil war. These are: 1. The Réglement 
Organique of Mount Lebanon from 1861 - made during the Ottoman Empire, 
under influence of France. 2. The first constitution of Lebanon (1926) within the 
borders of „Grand Liban‟ (declared in 1920), during the French Mandate period. 
3. The constitution of independent Lebanon 1943 and the informal National Pact 
                                                             
5 The Constitutional document is found in French in an online version at the Department of Law, 
University of Perpignan: http://mjp.univ-perp.fr/constit/lb1926.htm. This text is the 1926 
constitution including all later amendments until the amendment according to the Ta’if 
Agreement in 1991. The Ta’if Agreement is found in an English translation on NowLebanon.com. 
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that was negotiated at the same time. 4. The Ta‟if Agreement of 1989 that ended 
the civil war, and the following constitutional amendments in 1991. 
The four developments chosen are all characterized by taking place in a time of 
crisis or conflict, under heavy influence of foreign powers where the question of 
balancing sectarian interests was central every time. The reason for focusing on 
the constitution is that the document itself stipulates the division of political 
power, the discussions surrounding the document show the arguments for and 
against who should be in power. Apart from the constitutional document itself, the 
analysis includes primary and secondary sources that provide information about 
the broader political context of the constitutional development, and the main 
groups who were in- or excluded
6
 in the process.  
First, the main political groups in Lebanon are categorized in terms of common 
identities, related to a particular narrative of Lebanon. This is done by inspiration 
of Kais M. Firro
7
 and Ussama Makdisi
8
 (Firro 2003, Makdisi 2000). Firro refers 
to three identities under the headlines of: Lebanism, Arabism, and Michel Chiha 
(Firro 2003; 23-42). Inspired by Firro‟s categorization and Makdisi‟s conclusion 
that sectarian identities in Lebanon were constituted through an interplay between 
local elites and colonial powers (Makdisi 2000; 159-165), five different identities 
are presented in the analysis: Christian Lebanism, Multi-communal Lebanism, 
Arabism, Islamic Arabism and The Movement of the Deprived. This 
categorization is made based on a reading of the following empirical sources 
asking the question: how is political representation in Lebanon problematized, to 
be necessarily thought of in a particular way?   
The primary historical sources are political declarations, memoranda or 
manifestations and comments in printed media or literature. It is mainly through 
                                                             
6 In- and exclusion: See section 3.3.4 Logic of equivalence and difference 
7
 Kais M. Firro is Israeli, professor in Middle Eastern Studies at the University of Haifa. The first 
two chapters of his book (that are the ones primarily referred to) look at the “competing 
nationalist discourses we find emerging in mandatory Lebanon” (Firro 2003; 10).  
8 Ussama Makdisi is Lebanese, Ph.D. in history and connected to the history departments of 
Princeton and Rice Universities. His historical account is based on a narrative approach. Michel 
Foucault and Edward Said are mentioned as basic inspiration for reading Lebanese history. 
(Makdisi 2000; xi-14) 
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reading these sources that Firro‟s three categories have been modified, e.g. 
separating secular and Islamic Arabism, to the five applied now.  
The primary sources are found in Walter L. Browne‟s collection of historical 
documents „The political history of Lebanon, 1920-1950 volumes 1-4‟, 
specifically vol. I „Documents on Politics and Political Parties under the French 
Mandate, 1920-1936‟ and vol. III. „Lebanon‟s Struggle for Independence 1943-
44‟, and Cemam Reports 1974-1976 from the Center for the Study of the Modern 
Arab World at Saint Josephs University in Beirut. Further, some documents are 
found as appendixes to Meit Zamir‟s „A History of Modern Lebanon‟. Last, a 
selection of quotes, originally quoted in below secondary sources, is also 
included.  
The account of the five different identities is in the analysis supported by referring 
to the following secondary historical sources: Akarli, Engine Deniz 1993; „The 
Long Peace – Ottoman Lebanon 1861-1920‟, Hanf, Theodor 1993; „Co-existence 
in wartime Lebanon – Decline of a State and Rise of a Nation, Norton, Augustus 
Richard, 2009; „Hezbollah‟, Salibi, Kamal 1988; „A House of Many Mansion – 
The History of Lebanon Reconsidered‟, Traboulsi, Fawwaz 2007: „A History of 
Modern Lebanon‟, Zamir, Meir 1985; „The Formation of Modern Lebanon‟, 
Ziadeh, Hanna 2006: ‟Sectarianism and Intercommunal Nation-building in 
Lebanon‟.  
Apart from Makdisi, and to some extent Firro, it has been the aim to read the 
abovementioned history books without adapting their conclusions about why 
things happened as they did. As far as possible the historical accounts have been 
compared. For example, it can be seen as a reliable historical fact that the French 
Mandate power dealt mainly with Patriarch Huwayik and the Maronite Church as 
representing Lebanon, during the Mandate years. The analysis therefore includes 
this information, but makes its own conclusion about what it means. Reliability of 
the historical data in the analysis is thus based on reading opposing historical 
accounts of the same events, and comparing these, to be as aware as possible of 
the different currents of history writing. Further, as many primary sources are 
included as possible, and the secondary are used to support the context of these.  
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2.3.1 A comment on (Lebanese) history-writing  
Kamal Salibi, Meit Zamir and Engin Deniz Akarli are often-cited Lebanese 
historians. In fact, all other books mentioned above (with the exception of Norton) 
refer to at least one of these authors in one way or another. Youssef M. Choueiri, 
in „Kamal Salibi and the History of Lebanon: The Making of a Nation?‟ crit icizes 
the historical method of Salibi:  
“He looks at the writing of history as two separate stages. First, the 
historian collects his data and establishes the facts; only then is he to 
proceed to the second phase and begin his interpretation and analysis. The 
initial step is a totally objective operation, executed with the precision of a 
purely scientific method. (…) One would have liked to know how in 
practice such a separation between the two stages exists. (…) In what 
precise manner can the detached historian differentiate between factual and 
normative statements?” (Choueiri 2003; 130) 
This method of objective fact finding as basis for history writing, based on a 
natural science ideal, is contrary to the ontology and methodological point of 
departure of this paper (this will be explained in Chapter 3, Theory and 
Methodology). The quote illustrates well the difficulty of a thing such as 
„objective history-writing‟ in general, and the problem of relying on secondary 
historical sources; they are but one account of historical events, and there may 
well be other accounts and interpretations. As mentioned above, this is as far as 
possible sought overcome by cross-reading different types of historical analyses 
of the same subject. The quote also encircles a central criticism relevant for the 
problem-formulation of this paper; the assumption of religious groups as an 
objective and factual rather than constructed basis for the Lebanese state. For 
Salibi, the „Maronite myth‟ was the point of departure for his history-writing 
though he later revised this perspective. However, “his admission of the deficient 
nature of the Maronite myth as regards the history of Lebanon did not lead him to 
question the validity of the sectarian political system within which these images 
flourished and operated.“ (Ibid; 152) The same can to a large extents also be said 
for Zamir and Akarli: The „objective‟ presence of sects is not questioned – though 
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the political system might be. It is basically this construction of sects as natural 
political entities that this paper questions.  
 
2.4 Political representation after the civil war – Empirical focus 
and sources 
The second part of the analysis is based on the document of the new election law 
2008, speeches by Lebanese politicians during the election campaign 2009, the 
draft election law of 2005, Lebanese blogs, and two CSO
9
 campaigns. This part of 
the analysis concentrates on the power-sharing system as a practice that maintains 
the same problematization of Lebanon as before the civil war.  
The 2008 election law was the first one made in Lebanon, after many years under 
Syrian auspices. The process of drafting it was initially started in 2005, and the 
commission of the draft law had a clear mandate to design a law that would take 
steps in the direction of abolishing sectarianism in the political system 
(Ministerial Decision no. 58 2005). Due to political crises the draft election law 
was never adopted, instead another law was, as part of the Doha Agreement. The 
Doha Agreement in 2008 ended the political stalemate as well as armed clashes 
that were related to Israel‟s 34-days war in Lebanon 2006, and the conflict 
between the government and Hezbollah, concerning Hezbollah‟s private 
communication network (Doha Agreement 2008, The Guardian, 16.09 2008)   
The new election law was originally meant to soften the sectarian system, as it 
was the first new election law drawn in Lebanon by Lebanese after the Ta‟if 
agreement that ended the civil war (Ministerial decision no. 58 2008). The new 
law can therefore be seen as a good example of the more current processes of 
defining political representation in Lebanon. Secondly, the 2009 election was 
viewed by many with anxiety, as the rhetoric between the blocks of March 14 and 
March 8
10
 was polarizing sectarian groups (International Crisis Group 2009; EU 
                                                             
9 ‘Civil Society Organization’ (CSO) is here used instead of NGO, referring to a more loosely 
organized group, based on citizen initiative.  
10
 See appendix B. 
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2009). Along with the new election law, the 2009 election campaign illustrates the 
maintenance of sectarian practices, instituted through a historical process, that 
continue to form the problematizations of Lebanon.  
The draft election law and report is found online on the website of the Boutros 
Commission
11
. The election Law is found in a full English translation via the blog 
of Elias Muhanna
12
.  
The main parties of March 14 are the Future Movement, the Phalange, Lebanese 
Forces and Progressive Socialist Party. The main characters of March 8 are 
Hezbollah and Free Patriotic Movement, followed by Amal. According to a study 
of the media coverage of the parliamentary election, the amount of media 
coverage of the different political parties in the Lebanese media shows that the 
Future Movement, Hezbollah and Free Patriotic Movement were the most 
dominant (Maharat and IMS 2009; 12 pp.). The analysis of the 2009 election 
campaign is based on a reading of 35 speeches and statements during the election 
campaign from the main political parties, out of these 13 are quoted in the text. 
Specific attention is given to the three most dominant parties. All speeches and 
interviews are considered as part of the election campaign. The speakers are:  
Sheikh Naim Qassem (Deputy Secretary-General of Hezbollah),   
Hassan Nasrallah (Secretary-general of Hezbollah),  
Mohammad Raad (Member of Hezbollah‟s parliamentary bloc),  
Michel Aoun (President of Free Patriotic Movement),  
Nabih Berri (President of Amal),  
Saad Hariri (Leader of Future Movement),  
Ziad Baroud (Member of government from Future Movement),  
Fouad Siniora (Member of government from Future Movement),  
Samir Geagea (Head of Lebanese Forces),  
Antoine Zahra (Member of Lebanese Forces parliamentary bloc),  
Sami Gemayel (Member of Phalange Party central committee),  
                                                             
11 http://www.elections-lebanon.org/elections/docs_2_1_1_e.aspx?lg=en  
12
 http://qifanabki.com/about/ Elias Muhanna is a PhD student in Near Eastern Languages & 
Civilizations at Harvard University. 
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Amin Gemayel (Leader of Phalange Party),  
Dory Chamoun (Leader of National Liberal Party),  
Walid Jumblat (Leader of Progressive Socialist Party) 
The speeches used in the analysis are all but one obtained through the archive of 
nowlebanon.com, where English translations of a broad selection of resources on 
politics in Lebanon are available. One speech of Hassan Nasrallah has been found 
on ShiaTV with simultaneous translation
13
.  
The analysis of the 2008 election law and the 2009 election campaign is supported 
by reports from electoral monitors: Democracy Reporting International (DRI) and 
the Lebanese Association for Free Elections (LADE) (DRI and LADE 2008), 
European Union Election Observation Mission (EU 2005, EU 2009), International 
Crisis Group (International Crisis Group 2009), and International Foundation for 
Electoral Systems (IFES 2009, IFES 2009a).  
The second part of the analysis also looks at the contestations of the sectarian 
system. The draft law that in the end was never adopted is an example of this. 
Lebanon has a quite developed blogosphere, and many of these blogs deal with 
political issues, even if they are only descriptions of everyday lives, and not 
political blogs as such. Examples of these types of statements are included to 
show how some choose to contest the political system through the internet. Lastly 
two different CSO campaigns are included. These different examples of 
contestations serve to show that the same themes are brought up repeatedly by 
different groups and in different forums, offering an alternative problematization 
of political representation in Lebanon. 
Almost all Lebanese blogs are listed on the Lebanon aggregator
14
 website. These 
listed blogs have been reviewed. The reviewed blogs are just represented by two 
quotes in the text that are taken from “My Lebanon is burning to ashes” and 
“Lebanon Iznogood”. These quotes are chosen as they are seen to be good 
                                                             
13http://www.shiatv.net/view_video.php?viewkey=245ffec9fb8d47654da5&page=358&viewtype
=&category=  
14
 (http://lebanonaggregator.blogspot.com/search?updated-max=2010-03-
27T00%3A07%3A00%2B02%3A00&max-results=1) 
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examples of the types of opinions about the 2009 election that are uttered in the 
Lebanese blogosphere: A wish that Lebanese politics would focus on concrete 
everyday problems (e.g. the traffic), and a general feeling of apathy and anger 
directed at the sectarian system. Other examples of blogs reviewed that are found 
to express similar discontents are: Beirutspring.com
15
, In the Middle of the East
16
, 
For A Better Lebanon
17
, BabaGannouj et LaZaytouni
18
, B-side Beirut
19
. 
The two CSO campaigns described here have been identified through a review of 
debates and activities posted in the Lebanese blogosphere.  
The first is a campaign from 2006, ridiculing sectarianism on large billboards all 
over Beirut. The campaign was initiated by the civil society group amam05
20
. The 
second is Facebook-based, ongoing and mount to a demonstration, A Laïque Pride 
Parade, on April 25, 2010
21
. The Face-book group has almost 2000 members. The 
Laïque Pride as event has over 6000 participants registered.  
These two types of sources, blogs and campaigns, can be categorized as a type of 
face-to-face encounters, similar to the ones David Campbell refers to in his 
analysis of the war in Bosnia (Campbell 1994; 1-15). As he also notes: one could 
of course easily find people and organizations that express the opposite attitude of 
the one represented by these examples (Ibid; 2). In fact, this is what the analysis 
shows, and indeed the point is to demonstrate the dominant discursive logic in 
Lebanese politics. The contribution of the examples of bloggers and civil society 
                                                             
15
 http://beirutspring.com/blog/  
16 
http://middeno.wordpress.com/2009/06/    
17 http://forabetterlebanon.blogspot.com/search?updated-min=2009-01-
01T00%3A00%3A00%2B02%3A00&updated-max=2010-01-
01T00%3A00%3A00%2B02%3A00&max-results=50 
18
 http://betlz.blogspot.com/search?updated-max=2009-06-03T13%3A40%3A00-04%3A00&max-
results=50 
19 http://besidebeirut.wordpress.com/2009/05/ 
20 Amam is an acronym for the arab word for civil society (al mujtamah al madani). The NGO was 
founded after the Cedar Revolution in 2005, as they write on their homepage:”Sectarianism was 
one of the main factors leading to the civil war, but even today, everybody still thinks along 
religious lines and divides people into sectarian groups. The topic was always a taboo subject, 
until the “Spring Revolution” of 2005. With this movement, the creation of civil society groups 
brought together people from every religion, and made it clear to many that civil society-led 
initiatives could effectively make a difference.” (http://www.05amam.org/projects_sects.html)  
21 http://www.facebook.com/event.php?eid=200480171135&ref=ts. According to Reuters 
around 3000 people participated in the demonstration, see Reuters: “Civil Marriage, Not Civil 
War, Say Secular Lebanese” on http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE63O0RP20100425  
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initiatives is to show that outside of the political establishment it is not difficult to 
find persons for whom Lebanese national identity is articulated as different from 
the politically represented identity.  
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3. Theory and Methodology 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter initially discusses the choice of theory focusing on questions of 
ontology and methodology. Second, the theoretical concepts applied in the 
analysis are described. Last, focusing on the analytical strategy, the method of 
explanation (retroduction) is introduced, and it is explained how the theoretical 
concepts are operationalized.  
 
3.2 Choice of theory  
“A „scientific‟ approach attempting to determine the „essence‟ of the social would, 
in actual fact, be the height of utopianism.” (Laclau and Mouffe 1985; 143)  
As the quote reads, the discourse theory of Laclau and Mouffe rejects that any 
essence of the social can be defined scientifically. The subject matter of Laclau 
and Mouffe‟s discourse theory is the discursivity of the social, and what this 
implies for politics. In other words, the theory implies that there is no concrete 
definable ontology in the same sense as in e.g. economic theories that are based 
on the ontology of the market, which presupposes „rational‟ behavior as the 
natural behavior if information is perfect (Fuglsang and Olsen 2005; 29). This 
also means that the theoretical concepts are rather abstract and not easily 
applicable to an empirical analysis. The ontology of Laclau‟s and Mouffe‟s 
discourse theory (below named the impossibility of the social) dominates the 
methodological approach
22
, partly because of the basic assumption that social 
science is qualitatively different from natural science. Therefore, the choice of 
theory is shortly discussed in relation to philosophy of science.  
                                                             
22 Methodology is understood as the combination of ontology, epistemology, and method of 
explanation, methods, and research techniques that a specific scientific approach entails. 
(Fuglsang and Olsen 2005; 29) 
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3.2.1 Ontology – post-structuralism 
„Hegemony and socialist Strategy‟ (1985) presents a post-structuralist discourse 
theory, developed through a deconstructive reading of Marxist theory and in 
particular a genealogy of Gramsci‟s concept of hegemony (Howarth 2000; 85).   
In very short, Marxism distinguishes between the level of economic production 
and reproduction and that of ideology and politics. The former constitutes the 
ontology, meaning that the second can only be scientifically explained as effects 
of the underlying economic processes. (Howarth 2000; 99) In this way the 
structural logic of Marxism is that political interests and ideologies will always be 
an expression of essential economic structures. As for Gramsci‟s concept of 
hegemony, other factors apart from economic structures are introduced as 
influential on political interests. However, he maintains two structural 
assumptions: there are fundamental social classes and there is an economic core 
that in the end is the determinant of politics and ideology. (Howarth 2000; 99-
100) 
The point of post-structuralism in opposition to the structuralism of Marxism is 
that there are no pre-given structures, e.g. in the shape of class-interests, that 
determine the true interests of a subject. In fact, the subject in post-structuralism is 
not seen as one entity. Instead, it participates in different processes of 
identification, and thereby attains different subject positions. Therefore, a concept 
such as false consciousness is not viable in post-structuralism. (Laclau and 
Mouffe 1985; 115, 118-119)  
The impossibility of the social can be exemplified by the case of Lebanon: 
historically different Lebanese identities have been articulated, for example 
Christian Lebanism or Arabism as mentioned in the Method Chapter, and as will 
be presented in the Analysis. These identities depict Lebanon in a certain way, 
and claim to represent Lebanon in its entirety; Lebanon as a historically Christian 
country, or Lebanon as defined by its Arab heritage. If such an identity that fully 
represented all Lebanese existed, there could be a fully constituted society, and 
fixed social identities would be possible – because there would be a core or center 
ascribing a determined meaning. However, these discursive representations of 
25 
 
Lebanon must be seen as based on particular readings of history, not an account of 
a universal history. Therefore, aspiring to identify as „Lebanese‟ will be impaired 
by other Lebanese identifications claiming other identities. And, identification 
will be impaired by the circumstance that the understanding of Lebanon does not 
refer to an objectively existing and well-defined Lebanon - but to a discursive 
Lebanon; an always contingent Lebanon. As will be explained in 3.3 Theoretical 
Concepts, there are no identities, only processes of identification.   
The ontology of the impossibility of the social does not mean that there is no 
concrete reality. Lebanon is a sectarian state in practice, it is impossible to deny 
that there are strong religious factions and that these have a crucial influence on 
the country. Contingency does not exclude the existence of a material reality. 
However, what it implies is that discourses are material and produces material 
effects; they are not limited to the world of language, and thereby separated from 
a „more real‟ ontological level (Laclau and Mouffe 1985; 116-118). Therefore, the 
discourse of sectarianism in Lebanon does not refer objectively to the nature of 
the different sects - instead the logic inherent in the discourse of sectarianism 
constitutes the perceived objectivity of sectarian identity. 
It is important to note that the ontology of Laclau and Mouffe is not that the world 
consists of discourses, but rather that everything is discursive. The difference is 
that sharply distinguished discourses do not exist, but only partial fixation of 
meaning (Hansen 2005; 392).  
 
3.2.2 Methodology – post-positivism 
”The post-structuralist trend has been to experiment in the logic of subversion of 
discursive identities which follows from the logical impossibility of constituting a 
closed system.” (Laclau 1993; 433)  
Laclau here describes the object of analysis, subversion of discursive identities, as 
a consequence of the ontology. In other words, the ontology described above 
impacts what kind of research questions that is relevant. The type of research 
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questions posed necessitates a post-positivist methodological approach that takes 
into account the discursivity of both social science itself and its subject matter.  
The term post-positivism is borrowed from Glynos and Howarth (2007; 33-41). It 
refers to a methodological approach that does not assume cause-effect relations, 
and therefore does not generate social science theories that are law-like 
predictions, as can be asserted for natural science - e.g. the law of gravity (Ibid). 
Glynos and Howarth cite Karl Popper, who wrote: “The question, „How did you 
first find your theory?‟ relates, as it were, to an entirely private matter, as 
opposed to the question. „How did you test your theory?‟ which alone is 
scientifically relevant.” (Popper 1961 in Glynos and Howarth 2007; 35). Karl 
Popper is within the critical rationalist tradition, which is based on the positivist 
paradigm, but underlines the importance of falsification over verification
23
. The 
focus of science here is to empirically test hypotheses based on theory that aims to 
define causal laws. (Koch 2005; 91-95) The basic intention of this methodological 
approach is to achieve knowledge about reality (Koch 2005; 88). The post-
positivist methodology instead asserts that in social sciences there is no clear 
distinction between the positing of a hypothesis and the testing of a hypothesis. 
This is because the particular empirical context of an initial hypothesis and the 
self-interpretations of the social actors included, will influence the basic 
assumptions and form of reasoning that accepting the hypothesis will be 
conditioned on (Glynos and Howarth 2007; 36-37) – for example in the case of 
market dynamics, the basic assumption of rational actors (acting in own interest) 
will be integral to the analytical reasoning. Because of the overlapping of positing 
a hypothesis and of testing it, and because the same criteria that are valid for the 
subject matter of the case of Lebanon (everything is discursive) is valid for 
scientific research it is not possible to generate knowledge that is a simple 
reflection of the object that it claims to be knowledge of (Hansen 2005; 397).  
                                                             
23 Based on the logical problem that you can never verify a theory, because even if it seems to be 
true from the x amount of times it was tested, it cannot be induced based on the testing that the 
theory is always true. – The aim of empirical testing is therefore to see if the theory can ‘survive’ 
this testing, not to find empirical data that will verify the theory. (Koch 2005; 93-95) 
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As mentioned in the Method Chapter, a primary point of departure for this paper 
is a critical approach towards the perception of sects and denominations in 
Lebanon as objective entities that form a naturally given basis for the political 
system of the state. Had this topic been pursued within a positivist tradition of 
methodology, the research question would have centered on the hypothesis that 
sects are not the real expression of Lebanese citizenship or national identity; i.e. 
that there is another type of identity that is more real, e.g. class identity as 
Marxism would suggest. The purpose of the empirical analysis would then have 
been to justify this hypothesis of a more real identity.  
The ontology of Laclau and Mouffe therefore impacts the general methodological 
approach of the paper because 1) if a fully constituted society with fixed social 
identities is an impossibility (e.g. a Lebanon with a fixed national character 
embracing all of the population, for example defined by multi-confessionalism or 
by Christianity) , then 2) the nature of the social and the essence of social 
identities cannot be scientifically determined (e.g. the true national character of 
Lebanon, or the real best interest of the Shiite population as opposed to the 
Maronites), 3) positing a hypothesis presupposing a certain kind of identities 
therefore is not applicable (e.g. how can the Lebanese subject be defined?), and 4) 
the method and research techniques applied will have to focus on how meaning 
has become fixed in one way instead of another; therefore the analysis will focus 
on arguments and language broadly defined, rather than quantitative data (e.g. 
how has Lebanon been problematized as a site of religious conflict? Rather than: 
why has the relative demographic increase of the Shiite population altered the 
sectarian power-balance?) 
 
3.3 Theoretical concepts – discourse theory 
The dynamics of discourses are explained in this chapter, introducing the central 
concepts of Laclau‟s and Mouffe‟s discourse theory. The aim of the chapter is to 
describe how, under what conditions, and for what reasons, discourses are 
constructed, contested and change, while relating to the empirical topic of the 
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paper. Further, Derrida‟s concept of „iterability‟ is introduced, as it is used 
supplementary to Laclau‟s and Mouffe‟s concept of articulation.  
The concepts of discourse, articulation, logics of difference and equivalence, 
hegemony, subject position, social antagonism, logic of representation, and 
iterability are introduced, and their function in the analysis is explained. Most of 
the concepts are intertwined and the understanding of one is dependent on the 
understanding of another. Laclau and Mouffe‟s discourse theory is quite rich on 
concepts, but in the following only those directly relevant for the analysis are 
emphasized. Some concepts will be referred to before they are explained, if so, 
they are marked in italic.  
 
3.3.1 Discourse 
In short, according to Laclau and Mouffe, there is no such thing as non-discursive 
practices. This implies that objects exist outside of discursive contexts, but that 
they only become meaningful to social actors through being included in a 
discourse. Laclau and Mouffe‟s concept of discourse in other words transcends 
the distinction between the linguistic and extra-linguistic
24
 (Laclau 1993; 435), 
and creates an analogy between linguistic and social systems (Howarth 2000; 
102). As they put it, a discourse can be seen as “an ensemble of differential 
positions” where “all identity is relational and all relations have a necessary 
character” (Laclau and Moufffe 1985; 106). Meaning is therefore contingent, but 
not in any case random.  
The so-called differential positions in the discourse at interest here is the relation 
between the multiple sectarian and denominational identities on one hand and the 
national Lebanese identity on the other. Sectarian identities are constituted in 
                                                             
24
 This builds on the structural linguistic thoughts of Saussure and the Glossematic school of 
Copenhagen, centering on the relation between the signifier and the signified; language is form 
and not substance. Meaning that language is guided by formal rules, where each element is 
defined by its combinations and substitutions with the other elements. The basic point of 
departure for the concept of discourse in classical structuralism is thus that,”the subject could no 
longer be perceived as the source of meaning”, instead the subject had to be understood from its 
position in a structure. Post-structuralism emphasizes the contingency of the structure and 
therefore the impossibility of fully defining the subject. (Laclau 1993; 431-433) 
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relation to each other; e.g. the Maronite Christian identity in Lebanon has been 
constituted by a constant demand for protection against the alleged dominance 
and violence by the Muslims in the region. This is explained further by 
articulation and the logic of equivalence. The different discursive identities can be 
seen as discourses themselves, or rather, as meaning tied to a nodal point in the 
field of discursivity. This is explained by the perception that there is not one 
single discourse determining meaning, but a constant battle between discourses to 
fix meaning. Discourses are only partial fixations of meaning; they are not closed 
totalities. If they were, the relation between objects in the discourse would be 
fixed, and thereby unable to change, i.e. there would exist natural givens. In this 
case articulation could not take place. Therefore, Laclau and Mouffe argue that 
there is always a discursive exterior challenging the particular relational logic of a 
discourse. The consequence of this is that the relation necessary within the logic 
of a discourse can be „threatened‟ by articulation, and „this is but another way of 
saying that there is no identity which can be fully constituted‟ (Ibid; 111). 
The object of analysis in this paper is the discourse of sectarianism that is seen as 
hegemonic. The argument is that the parliamentary system is based on a particular 
logic of representation that through logic of difference incorporates the chains of 
equivalence (i.e. identities based on logic of equivalence) of the different sects 
and denominations, and via that locks the subject position of the citizen to the 
religiously defined. Power thus becomes constituted by the religious subject 
position; this type of power is central from the first constitutional document to the 
current one. The discursive exterior mentioned above thus becomes a logic of 
representation not based on the religious subject position, but e.g. on secularism 
or class identity. As Makdisi writes, concerning the discourse of sectarianism in 
Lebanon: “sectarianism refers to the deployment of religious heritage as a 
primary marker of modern political identity” (Makdisi 2000; 7).  
 
3.3.2 Articulation 
Articulation is any practice that establishes a relation whereby identity is 
modified. Articulation is a founding concept for Laclau and Mouffes 
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understanding of discourses, as it is by articulation that discourses are constructed 
and changed. In the same way as there are no non-discursive social practices, 
every social practice is articulatory (Lalcau and Mouffe 1985; 113). The concept 
of articulation is central for the empirical research about political identities in 
Lebanon. It is through finding those articulations (e.g. in historical documents, 
political statements and speeches, official documents, concrete actions etc.) that 
construct and maintain the sectarian identities on the one hand, and those that 
challenge the sectarian identities on the other that the discourse of sectarianism 
can be investigated.  
All discourses attempt to fix meaning in a certain way. As the concept of 
discourse detaches the connection between signifier and signified, discursive 
battles are seen as battles over determining the meaning of „floating signifiers‟ 
(Laclau 1993; 435). An obvious example could be the concept of democracy that 
can be ascribed many meanings. In the context of Lebanon this is relevant, as the 
concepts of democracy, consociational democracy and sectarian power-sharing to 
some extent are used interchangeably, and one is used to describe the other, while 
the actual formula of power-sharing is contested. This is analyzed through looking 
at concrete articulations in the election campaign 2009. 
 
3.3.3 Iterability 
Derrida‟s concept of iterability is applied here as a supplementary to the concept 
of articulation. This is because iterability can be seen as a specific form of 
rearticulation. This is based on the idea that meaning is not referring to essential 
characteristics of the signified, and neither is meaning purely defined by context; 
the meaningfulness of a concept will always be somewhat based on repetition as 
this is how it makes sense as part of communication between people, but the 
concept will also be modified by the people who use it in a certain context – 
maybe even contrary to its first meaning (Derrida 1972; 83-84, 90-91). Thereby 
“iterability problematizes the idea of a pure continuity or discontinuity in the 
production and dissemination of meaning” (Howarth 1994; 8).  
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The concept of iterability is used in the first part of the analysis to examine the 
way the role of the Head of State has been simultaneously repeated and modified 
in Lebanon; starting out with a Maronite demand for special representation of 
Christians, then modified by Muslim communities wishing for stronger political 
representation. The last modification is however seen as based on a repetition of 
the sectarian logic of the Maronites that then became the justification for being 
included as Muslims, as the Lebanese religious subject became considered 
universal.  
Derrida applies the concept in the deconstruction of metaphysical concepts. Here, 
it is used in a more empirical context to underline the continuity/discontinuity in 
the development of a sectarian logic of representation.  
 
3.3.4 Logic of difference and equivalence 
“Every society constitutes its own forms of rationality and intelligibility by 
dividing itself; that is, by expelling outside itself any surplus of meaning 
subverting it.” (Laclau and Mouffe 1985; 136-37)  
Since there is no center of the social and a discourse cannot constitute itself by 
reference to itself, the underlying identical features of elements that together 
represent a specific identity must refer to something outside of the discourse. 
(Ibid; 126) Logic of equivalence describes how a discourse is negatively 
constituted in such a way that all its elements are equal in that they represent an 
anti-identity. Thereby the positive features of the moments disappear and take on 
the meaning of being the opposite of another identity. This also implies that 
equivalence is the dynamic of antagonism, and that equivalence always creates a 
binary antagonism.  
In the case of Lebanon this means that the concept of equivalence, as an example, 
can be applied to mean that Maronite Christians and Orthodox Greek can be the 
anti-identity of Shiite and Sunni at the same time; understood in the sense that 
they are Christian as opposed to Muslim, Pro-western (Europe and USA) as 
opposed to Pro-eastern (Syria and Iran), or European/Mediterranean as opposed to 
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Arab/Middle Eastern. In other words an equivalential identity is, simplified, 
expressed in terms of: There is one kind, that is Us, and there is another kind, that 
is the Others. The trick in the analysis is therefore to look for the articulations that 
erase differences, or the positive features, of the moments in a discourse, and 
instead construct them as equivalent, in terms of a common negative identity. 
(Laclau and Mouffe 1985; 128, 130)  Makdisi uses a similar type of reasoning in 
his analysis of Ottoman Lebanon, where he sees the interaction between the 
society of Mount Lebanon and the two imperial projects of the Ottoman empire 
and France as a process whereby religion became “the site of a colonial encounter 
between a self-styled „Christian‟ West and what it saw as its perennial adversary, 
an „Islamic‟ Ottoman empire.” (Makdisi 2000; 2)  
Logic of difference is the basic logic of the system of differential positions as 
explained under the headline „Discourse‟. Logic of difference represents a simple 
identity where all meaning is conferred by an objective relation between its 
elements. As Laclau and Mouffe point out, a discourse cannot exist only in terms 
of the logic of difference, because this would mean a closed entity where 
differences always were placed in the same relation to each other. What 
constitutes a discourse is therefore its chains of equivalence, as the chains of 
equivalence are the constituting outside; the negative identity. (Laclau and Mouffe 
1985; 143-44) There is therefore a constant friction between the two logics: 
Society will neither split into two strictly divided poles, neither will it be a fully 
constituted unit. The logic of equivalence subverts the objectivity of the logic of 
difference, and the logic of difference subverts the negativity of the logic of 
equivalence.  (Ibid; 129) Hegemony operates on the logic of difference, as it tries 
to define the objective in politics. 
Applying these two logics to the case of Lebanon therefore contributes by not 
claiming that sectarian identities are wrong, and by not referring to another 
underlying truer identity. Instead applying discourse theory means trying to 
unmask the sectarian discourse, and show that the formation of any identity 
includes the exclusion or silencing of the „other‟ (Norval 1997; 121) and that 
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modern identities are always located in a society crisscrossed with antagonisms 
(Laclau and Mouffe 1985; 135, 138-139).  
 
3.3.5 Social antagonism 
 “…the limit of all objectivity does have a form of precise discursive presence, 
and this is antagonism” (Ibid; 122): The consequence of the impossibility of 
society and of fully constituted identities is antagonism. Antagonism is a concept 
explaining conflict per se, not the conditions which lead to conflict; antagonism is 
the Other restraining you from achieving your full identity. (Ibid; 124,125) 
Antagonism therefore exists in any place, and politics will always be concerned 
with antagonism in one way or the other, be it in Denmark or Lebanon. In 
Lebanon, social antagonism has led to violent conflicts, and to a very particular 
democratic construction, designed for the religious identities to keep each other 
checkmate. It is in this particular context that antagonism is referred to, realizing 
that it cannot be avoided, but only modified to take on a different face. It is 
therefore part of the analysis to look at the interplay of antagonistic identities in 
the Lebanese democratic model. 
 
3.3.6 Hegemony  
First of all, the concept of hegemony in Laclau and Mouffe‟s discourse theory is 
central, because the theory focuses on a conceptualization of political power 
(Laclau 1993; 435). “…as undecidability operates on the very ground of the 
social, objectivity and power become indistinguishable. (…) power is the trace of 
contingency within the structure.” (Ibid)  
Based on this quote, to analyze a hegemonic discourse is to reveal the contingency 
of the perceived objectivity that the power of a political system is based on. There 
are no necessary laws in history; hegemony is based on historically specific rules 
and conventions that structure the production of meanings in particular historical 
contexts (Howarth 2000; 128). The concept of hegemony and power means that 
there is not one actor or group that holds the power as such, the power is 
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transcendental. However, the hegemonic subject is always partially external to the 
hegemonic project and thereby able to modify its meaning through articulations in 
the particular contexts where it is located. Hegemony is seen as a form of politics, 
not as a single determining center (Laclau and Mouffe 1985; 135, 139). 
Hegemony operates by logic of difference, but it always operates in a social field 
characterized by logic of equivalence (Ibid; 135 pp.) 
Just as there is a constant interplay between the logics of difference and 
equivalence, and that it is in this interplay that hegemonic projects can prevail, 
there is a constant interplay between universality and particularity (Howarth 1997; 
5, Howarth and Stavrakakis 2000; 12).  
In the context of this paper‟s analysis the connection between universality, 
particularity and hegemony becomes relevant, because power in Lebanon 
historically has become constituted by sectarian belonging. It is this power that 
the parliamentary system is still based on. It is argued that the political system of 
power-sharing includes some particularistic identities of sect and denomination 
and excludes other. At the same time the power-sharing system makes it possible 
for sectarian and denominational identities to claim their universality as 
„Lebanese‟.  
 
3.3.7 Subject positions – political subjectivity 
Just as Laclau and Mouffe deny the possible existence of any kind of essential 
identity, there is no pre-constituted subject. The concept of subject positions 
illustrates the decentralization of the subject, as there is not one whole subject but 
differential and interrelated subject positions (Laclau and Mouffe 1985; 115, 117). 
This basically means that the Lebanese cannot exist solely as religious subjects, 
and that the religious subject position itself is also contingent and interrelated to 
other subject positions, this could be class, family, sex, etc. The contingency of 
discourses results in a struggle to achieve identity, therefore individuals at some 
point have to identify with certain groups or political projects when social 
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identities are in crisis. Laclau calls this action of identification political 
subjectivity. (Howarth 2000; 109) 
Using the concept „political identity‟ in the context of Laclau and Mouffe is 
therefore somehow to state the obvious; all identities are political, as they are 
constructed through political processes of in- and exclusion (i.e. logic of 
difference and equivalence).   
Therefore, when many Shiite Muslims choose to vote for Hezbollah, it is not 
because they are essentially Shiite and Hezbollah is representing this essential 
Shiite identity. It is instead interpreted as sign that social identities are threatened, 
and that they are forced to act upon this. Through this action of identification, 
voting for Hezbollah, political subjectivity is created, and thereby a new subject 
position; Shiite, supporting Hezbollah with all what this connotes.  
The outspoken presumption that this paper builds on is thus: Sectarian identities in 
Lebanon are results of political subjectivity. The relevant question therefore is 
not, what is the true Lebanese identity? Or, how can the political system best be 
arranged so as to accommodate all given interests of the religious groups? 
Relevant questions are rather, how have sectarian identities been shaped, and how 
are they changing?  
 
3.3.8 Logic of representation and dislocation 
“(…) no pure relation of representation is obtainable because it is of the essence 
of the process of representation that the representative has to contribute to the 
identity of what is represented (…)” (Laclau 1993b; 280) 
Who are represented if there are no fixed subjects, identities or interests? Laclau 
and Mouffe note that political practice contributes to the construction of the 
interests that it represents (Laclau and Mouffe 1985; 120). This is connected to the 
impossibility of what Laclau calls the „society effect‟; where power objectively 
coincides with legitimacy because it is the direct representation of a universal 
identity (Laclau 1993b; 290-291, Laclau and Zac 1994; 18-19). 
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Looking at sectarian identities and their interplay with the political institutions in 
Lebanon this idea becomes very central; is political practice in Lebanon actually 
constructing the sectarian identities, when the argument on the contrary seems to 
have always been that the political system is designed as it is, because of the 
sectarian nature of the country?  
Given the openness or undecidability of the social, any fixing of identity is in 
principle a dislocation, because no identity is a signifier referring directly to the 
essence of the subject; some meaning will always escape it. A dislocation is 
visible when a subject is necessitated to confront the contingency of social 
relations more directly than at other times. (Glynos and Howarth 2007; 110-111) 
The dislocatory effect of any discursive identity is particularly relevant in the 
context of this paper in relation to the logic of representation. This is because it is 
argued that the political system is based on a hegemonic logic of representation 
that ties political identity to a religious subject position. The focus of the analysis 
is to show the contingency of this logic of representation, and thereby reveal its 
dislocatory effect, i.e. that it excludes discursive identities that are not based on 
the primacy of the religious subject position. In the second part of the analysis 
secular contestations show how Lebanese citizens confront the contingency of the 
logic of representation.  
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3.4 Analytical strategy and operationalization 
3.4.1 Method of explanation – Retroduction 
As the paper is based on poststructuralist ontology, the method of explanation can 
neither be deduction or induction. It is not the aim of the analysis to test a certain 
hypothesis, and prove or approximate a cause-effect relation. Following Howarth 
and Glynos retroductive reasoning
25
 is to conjecture what the case is: 1) A 
surprising, anomalous or wondrous phenomena is observed (P), 2) this P would be 
explicable as a matter of course, if a hypothesis were true (H), and so there is 
good reason to think that H is true (Glynos and Howarth 2007; 26). In this way 
the conclusion of the analysis will be a hypothesis. This might sound somewhat 
unscientific, as the deductive method first infers a hypothesis and then justifies it  
– retroduction does not prove the hypothesis, it conjectures a hypothesis. 
Retroduction, however, is in this case rather a way of reflecting about the position 
of the researcher in social science, and social science as a field that is qualitatively 
different from natural science: “the form of reasoning involved in positing a 
hypothesis and the form of reasoning involved in accepting a hypothesis cannot be 
differentiated so starkly in a social science context.”(Glynos and Howarth 2007; 
27)  
The initial wondrous phenomenon observed in the case of this paper is the 
Lebanese power-sharing system based on religious quota. Why is the 
parliamentary system based on religious quota? This initial observation makes up 
the P. The next step is then through questioning empirical facts and data to infer a 
hypothesis that can account for the observed phenomenon. Laclau and Mouffe‟s 
discourse theory, with its focus on the shaping of political identities, was included 
to provide theoretical concepts for explaining P; to infer a hypothesis. The basic 
assumptions of this theory thus constitute the form of reasoning used to reach a 
conclusion, and (as the quote above reads), this form of reasoning simultaneously 
becomes the basis for accepting the conclusion.  
 
                                                             
25
 This is not to say that retroduction is only used in poststructuralist social science; e.g. also the 
critical realist school applies retroductive reasoning (Glynos and Howarth 2007; 28). 
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3.4.2 Analytical strategy  
As described in the Chapter 2, Method, the reading of the empirical data is based 
on a method of “problematization”(Glynos and Howarth 2007; 167, Foucault 
1985a). The strategy of problematization implies the question of: How is political 
representation in Lebanon articulated as a particular problematic that needs a 
particular solution? 
The analytical starting point is that different types of problematizations of 
Lebanon offer different identities. The focus is then on the interaction of 
processes of identification and political representation in Lebanon‟s political 
system and how this interaction has a limiting effect on political contestation.  
What is analyzed is the discourse of sectarianism. This is done by looking at the 
practices of the power-sharing system, and show how they are dominated by a 
sectarian logic of representation. This logic is based on the assumption of an 
objective religiously defined subject. 
The operationalization of the theory is inspired by the analyses of, respectively, 
Ottoman Lebanon (Ussama Makdisi 2000), the war in Bosnia (David Campbell 
1998), and the Apartheid discourse and Black Consciousness Movement in South 
Africa (Aletta Norval 1994 and David Howarth 1994).  
The concept of articulation is relevant throughout the analysis, as it is a general 
analytical tool and dynamic that is valid for all discursive structures. Articulations 
are seen as the concrete empirical practices, e.g. the constitutional document or a 
speech
26
, which are analyzed.  
 
Political representation before the civil war - Five identities, one hegemonic 
logic 
As written in the Chapter 2, Method, five different identities have been identified 
by reading the historical sources: Christian Lebanism, Multi-communal Lebanism, 
Arabism, Islamic Arabism and The Movement of the Deprived. These identities 
                                                             
26
 See Method Chapter for a presentation of the empirical sources. 
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each offer their own problematization of Lebanon. The political system from the 
governing structure at the end of the Ottoman Empire, through the mandate period 
and the power-sharing system after the independence are seen as practices that 
formed these problematizations.  
The analysis of the political system before the civil war applies the theoretical 
concept of iterability to investigate how the role of the head of state as defined in 
the constitutional documents over history has been simultaneously repeated and 
modified. The concepts of logic of equivalence and difference are applied to show 
how different identities were in- and excluded as politically represented. The 
concept of hegemony is applied to show how the religious subject has been 
instituted as the objective center, fixing the discourse of sectarianism by logic of 
difference.  
This part of the analysis answers the first part of the problem-formulation: How 
have the Lebanese citizens historically been articulated as religious subjects?  
 
Political representation after the civil war - The continued dislocation of 
representation 
Drawing on the conclusion of the first part of the analysis, it is analyzed how the 
practices of the current power-sharing system maintain the sectarian discourse that 
was prevailing before the civil war. The electoral law and rhetoric before the 2009 
election are seen as such practices, and illustrate the very limited frame within 
which politics in Lebanon is set, and thereby the limited type of political solutions 
that can be reached. This is illustrated by showing 1) how the electoral law 
reconfirms antagonisms, represented by the identity of Christian Lebanism; the 
identity offering the dominating problematization of Lebanon before the civil war, 
2) how the electoral campaigns were centered on fixing the „old‟ floating 
signifiers of „sovereignty‟ and „power-sharing‟. That the sectarian logic of 
representation is a dislocation is illustrated by the secular contestations of the 
primacy of the religious subject position in Lebanese politics; the electoral draft 
law and civil society initiatives. 
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This part of the analysis contributes to answering the second part of the problem-
formulation: How does the political system based on the articulation of the citizen 
as a religious subject, limit the scope for political contestation? 
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4. Lebanisms - Identification in Lebanon in a historical 
perspective  
4.1 Introduction  
”Since the emergence of Lebanon as a state in 1920, the Christian and Muslim 
Lebanese have been in fundamental  disagreement over the historicity of their 
country; the Christians by and large affirming it, and the Muslims denying it.” 
(Salibi 1988; 3) 
This quote by Kamal Salibi illustrates the Lebanese mainstream history-writing‟s 
perception of a Christian and a Muslim sect as main actors in Lebanon. Further, it 
illustrates the well-documented historical fact that a central reason for the 
establishment of Lebanon as an independent state was to create a Christian state, 
strongly supported by France. Last but not least, it shows that there are different 
readings of Lebanese history, and that understandings of the past have been 
crucial in shaping different political identities in Lebanon. 
In other words, after the establishment of Lebanon as a state, different discursive 
identities representing different historical accounts of Lebanon, were struggling to 
fix the national identity of the state and its people(s); this lead to different ideas of 
Lebanon; different Lebanons. As Ussama Makdisi writes: “There has never been 
a pure sectarianism, only narratives about its purity” (Makdisi 2000; 165). 
 
4.2 Christian Lebanism 
Christian Lebanism problematizes Lebanon as a site of religious conflict. Lebanon 
must be defined as Christian, as if it is not, the Christian community will drown in 
the Muslim masses of the Middle-East. Further, Lebanon is seen as a historically 
Christian entity that has been arabized against its will. The following illustrates 
this problematization of Lebanon in terms of a Christian-Muslim antagonism.  
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Before the civil war Christian Lebanism was the most dominant political identity 
of Lebanon. It is this problematization of Lebanon that to a large extent still 
defines the dominant logic of the political system. In the following, this identity is 
represented by Maronite Patriarch Elias Huwayik (patriarch from 1898-1931), 
Emile Eddé (1886-1949) and Charles Corm (1894-1963), the French Mandate 
Power (1920-1943), the Phalange Party (1936-) and Lebanese Forces (1976-).  
The following citation is from the poem „La Montagne Inspirée‟ by Charles Corm 
from 1943: “Jesus made me love Mohamet and 
Moses/…to love our enemy, especially that he 
hurts, us is to triumph against evil…/Muslim 
brother, understand my candor/I am the real 
Lebanon, authentic and devoted” (Charles 
Corm 1934 in Traboulsi 2007; 95). The poem is 
from the year of Lebanese independence from 
France. Charles Corm was part of the political 
wing around Emile Eddé, who was prime 
minister 1929-1930 and president 1936-1941. 
The poem illustrates the particular Christian 
identity that this political wing represented: A 
Christian identity that is seen as equal to the 
Lebanese identity - Christian equals Lebanon. 
Further, the poem presents it as a sign of good Christian practice that the presence 
of Muslims (and Jews) is accepted, even though they are hostile elements.  
Mount Lebanon and Greater Lebanon 
(Traboulsi 2007; 42) 
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Charles Corm also edited the „La Revue Phénicienne‟ (the publication of which 
began in 1919), and part of the historical narrative of Christian Lebanism is that 
the Lebanese people descend from the Phoenicians
27
. (Salibi 1988; 171-172, Firro 
2003; 24) The Revue Phénicienne was a Francophile and anti-Arab journal, the 
articles advocated the establishment of Grand Liban, and was based on 
geographical and cultural determinism based on the particular reading of 
Lebanon‟s history as a Christian and Phoenician history. (Kaufman 2004; 5) 
The basic interpretation of Lebanon as an essentially Christian country, and the 
narrative of a Muslim and a Christian sect, goes back at least to the time of the 
Ottoman Empire (Makdisi 2000; 69 pp.). 
Under the Ottomans the territory of 
Mount Lebanon was primarily inhabited 
by the two groups of Maronite 
Christians and Druze. Mount Lebanon 
was extended to „Grand Liban‟ in 1920 
under the French Mandate. This territory 
corresponds to Lebanon nowadays
28
. 
(Traboulsi 2007; 3-23, 80)  
The Réglement Organique from 1861, 
viewed as the first document to 
articulate Lebanon as a modern political 
unity, is often seen as triggered historically by a massacre by the Druze of the 
Christians in Mount Lebanon: In the spring of 1860 thousands of Maronite 
Christians were killed by Druze in the Southern region of Mount Lebanon. The 
                                                             
27 The Phoenicians were settled in the coastal area of the now Israel, Lebanon and Syria from 
1550 BC. According to Salibi the Phoenicians were merchants who remained influential 
throughout Greek and Roman times. In 700 AD the Arab conquest took place, and all of greater 
Syria became arabized. The non-Arab culture of Phoenicia was by Maronites seen to have 
survived in Mount Lebanon, as the coastal areas fell under Arab control, and formed a basis for a 
distinct non-Arab modern Lebanese nationality, represented by the Maronites (Salibi 1988; 171-
172)  
28 Grand Liban, apart from Mount Lebanon, included the coastal cities of Beirut, Sidon, Tyre and 
Tripoli, and the four ex-Ottoman cazas of Hasbaya, Rashaya, Ba’albak and Akkar. (Traboulsi 2007; 
80) See maps above. 
Modern Lebanon (Traboulsi 2007; Map 1) 
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Ottoman foreign minister made sure that the Ottoman officers and officials were 
punished for not stopping the Druze attack, and the Druze leaders themselves 
were imprisoned or fled the Mountain to avoid punishment. Thereby, the only 
powerful institution left in Mount Lebanon after the 1860 massacre was the 
Maronite Church. (Akarli 1993; 30-31, Makdisi 2000; 118 pp.)  
The events leading up to the killings in 1860 were no doubt part of a much larger 
picture, of which the two main factors should be introduced: 1) The Maronites in 
the South were mainly peasants while the landlords were mainly Druze. In the 
North, both the peasants and the landlords were mainly Maronite. After the 
peasant Maronites in the North had rebelled against the leading Maronite family 
and succeeded, the peasants in the South felt they could do the same. The 
Maronite Church applauded this development, and did not try to hide their 
aspiration for a Maronite emirate under French protection, hoping that a rebellion 
would put an end to Druze rule. 2) In large, merchants, notables and artisans in 
Syria
29
 were suffering from increased dependence on Europeans and their local 
associates, as the Europeans held an advantageous position in most economic 
relations. Both Muslims and Christians were suffering from this, but the 
Christians in general seemed to handle the new situation better. This cannot be 
viewed isolated from the fact that many Europeans showed little sympathy for 
Muslims, while favoring Christians in business relationships. The drafting of the 
Règlement Organique took place between the Ottoman and French after the 
massacre. France insisted on the need for protection of its Christian allies and 
merchant connections in Mount Lebanon
30
. (Akarli 1993: 28-30, Makdisi 2000; 
167-169)  
                                                             
29 With Syria is here intended the ‘Greater Syria’ (Bilad al-Sham; the current Syria, Lebanon, 
Palestine and Jordan) of which Lebanon was considered to be a part of. At the same time as the 
conflict between Maronites and Druze broke out in Mount Lebanon, there was a massacre on 
Christians in the Christian merchant quarter of Bab Touma in Damascus, the capital of Syria. It is 
worth noting that several historians point out the fact that poorer Christian families living in 
other parts of the city were not targeted. (E.g. Traboulsi 2007; 35-36,  Makdisi 2000; 146 pp.) 
30 The land owned by the Maronite Church was at that time mainly used for silk-production, and 
many Christian, especially Maronite, peasants were silkworkers. The French had invested in the 
sericulture of Mount Lebanon, and there was a large import of silk from Mount Lebanon to 
France. (Traboulsi 2007; 37-38, 46-47) 
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The abovementioned outline of events is to say that there was both an idea of 
religious commonness between the French and the Maronite Church, but there 
was certainly also a French imperial aspiration for the Levant in general. The need 
for Christian protection should therefore not be seen as completely objective 
based on the massacre in 1860, but just as much as part of a French policy based 
on French interests and aspirations. (Makdisi 2000; 8-12, Salibi 1985; 43-44)  
The Règlement stipulates the creation of religiously homogenous administrative 
units, and article 11 states that ”All members of the courts and administrative 
assemblies will be chosen and appointed by the leaders of their sect in agreement 
with the notables of the sect” (Makdisi 2000; 161-2). In this way, the Règlement 
introduced Lebanon both as a political entity, and took the first step to a 
governing system explicitly based on sectarian political representation. A revision 
in 1864 of the Règlement reformed the Administrative Council (consultative 
council to the Ottoman governor) from being composed by two seats for each 
major sect (Maronite, Druze, Greek Orthodox, Greek Catholic, Sunni, Shiite) to 
five Muslims to seven Christians (4 Maronites, 3 Druze, 2 Greek Orthodox, 1 
Greek Catholic, 1 Shiite, 1 Sunni) (Traboulsi 2007; 43, Akarli 1993; 82). Further, 
as part of the deal between France and the Ottomans, the Ottoman governor 
appointed to Mount Lebanon was Christian. This was not usual practice in the 
Sunni Muslim Ottoman Empire.  And, although the Règlement was promulgated 
in the form of an Ottoman imperial decree, it was based on an international 
protocol (Akarli 1993; 32-35).  
It is the sectarian governing system and the relation between Christian elites, 
especially the Maronite Church and the later Mandate power, France, which came 
to influence the initial design of political representation in Lebanon. When 
Lebanon came under French Mandate after the 1
st
 World War, the French dealt 
primarily with the Patriarch of the Maronite Church as representing Lebanon. It 
was thus the Patriarch who negotiated the terms of Lebanon under the French 
Mandate and the extension of Mount Lebanon‟s borders. In the memorandum to 
the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 presented by the Patriarch it read:  
46 
 
“Par une conception abusive de la notion de la langue, on a voulu 
confondre le Liban et la Syrien ou, plutôt, fonder le Liban dans la Syria. 
C‟est lá une erreur. Sans remonter à leurs ancêtres Phéniciens, les Libanais 
ont toujors constitué une entité nationale distinct des groupements voisins 
par sa langue, ses moeurs, ses affinities, sa culture occidentale.”31 
(Memorandum presented by the Maronite Patriarch Hawayik to the Paris 
Peace Conference, 25 October 1919 – Les Revindications Du Liban, 
Memoire de la Delegation Libanaise a la Conference de la Paix in Zamir 
1985; 270) 
The French prime minister in a letter to Patriarch Huwayik wrote: “…la France 
qui a tout fait en 1860 pour assurer au Liban un territoire plus étendu, n‟oublie 
pas que le resserrement det limites actuelle résulte de la longue oppression dont a 
souffert le Liban.”32 (Letter from Clemenceau, the French Prime Minister, to the 
Patriarch Hawayik, 10 November 1919 in Zamir 1985; 279) 
Contrary to the Patriarch and the French, the King-Crane Commission of the 
International Mandate Commission
33
 in August 1919 made these 
recommendations regarding the position of Lebanon towards Syria: 
“Lebanon has achieved a considerable degree of prosperity and autonomy 
within the Turkish Empire. She certainly should not find her legitimate 
aspirations less possible within a Syrian national State. On the contrary, it 
may be confidently expected that both her economic and political relations 
with the rest of Syria would be better if she were a constituent member of 
the State, rather than entirely independent of it.  
As a predominantly Christian country too, Lebanon naturally fears 
Moslem domination in a unified Syria. But against such domination she 
would have a fourfold safeguard (…). Moreover, there would be less 
danger of a reactionary Moslem attitude, if Christians were present in the 
                                                             
31
 Roughly translated: ”as a consequence of a misuse of the concept of language, people have 
wanted to confuse Lebanon with Syria, or above all, establish Lebanon in Syria. That is the 
mistake. - Without reestablishing their ancestors the Phoenicians, the Lebanese have always 
constituted a distinct national entity from its neighboring groupings, because of its language, 
customs, its internal likeness, its Western culture” 
32 Roughly translated: “France, whom has done everything possible in 1860 to secure Lebanon an 
extended territory, will not forget that the strengthening of the current borders is a result of the 
long oppression that Lebanon has suffered” 
33The advisors of the Commission had all been previously connected as experts with the Peace 
Conference in Paris, and had been students of the special problems of the Near East. “The 
method of the Commission, in its inquiry in Syria, was to meet in conference individuals and 
delegations who should represent all the significant groups in the various communities, and so to 
obtain as far as possible the opinions and desires of the whole people.” (King-Crane Commission 
Report 1919)  
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state in considerable numbers, rather than largely segregated outside the 
state, as experience of the relations of different religious faiths in India 
suggests.” (King-Crane Commission Report 1919; Recommendations)  
The report was based on petitions from and meetings with different communities 
in Greater Syria. As an example, according to Traboulsi, the majority of the 
mostly Greek Catholic area of Zahle voted in favor of annexation to Syria, and 
against the mandate (Traboulsi 2007; 81). The recommendations of the King-
Crane commission, the petitions it was based, on, and the existence of a large 
Syrian-Arab nationalist faction (which will be described later in section 4.4 
Arabism) in Lebanon who actively had opposed the establishment of Grand Liban 
all adds to the argument that establishing Lebanon in the shape of Grand Liban, 
and as a predominantly Christian state was not at all a natural given, though it is 
articulated as such in the above quotes from the Patriarch and the French Prime 
Minister.   
The constitution of 1926 granted the President extensive executive powers, and 
the right to dismiss ministers of the cabinet. He was solely responsible to the 
French High Commissioner. (Constitution Libanaise du 23 Mai 1926; Titre II, 
chapitre IV, Titre V art. 90, Traboulsi 2007; 90). It is important to note that even 
though the Constitution only stipulated for the President to be a „mentally and 
physically healthy Lebanese‟, the reality was such that the President had to be a 
Christian. As the U.S. Consul wrote concerning the presidential elections in 1932:  
“…while there is nothing in the Lebanese Constitution preventing a 
Moslem from being the Chief Executive, it is the opinion of M. Ponsot
34
 
that, on the present occasion at least, a Moslem should not be chosen for 
that office. (…) Now, if the Lebanon were presided over by a Moslem at 
the very time when the new Moslem Republic over the hills
35
 was getting 
into its stride, there might be an undue attraction exercised on the smaller 
coastal state. The French are not anxious for this.” (Elections in Lebanon, 
Dispatch of the S Consul to the U.S. Secretary of State April 4, 1932 in 
Browne 1976; 148) 
The revision of the Constitution in 1943 removed all references to the French 
Mandate, thereby abolishing all the Mandate‟s prerogatives as previously set out 
                                                             
34
 French Mandate Commissioner at the time 
35
 Referring to Syria 
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in the Constitution. At the same time the so-called National Pact was agreed upon 
(see section 4.4.Arabism). The National Pact is an oral agreement, the basis for 
which exists in the Ministerial Declaration of Riad al-Solh (Sunni Prime Minister) 
of 8 October 1943. Looking only at the formal text of the Constitution, the power 
was even more effectively centralized with the president than before (who by 
customary practice was to be a Christian) because it left him unchecked by any 
authority. (Ziadeh 2006; 114). 
Especially the 1930s experienced a growth of new parties, some of which came to 
seriously influence the political development, and still do. An example is the 
Phalange Party that was established in 1936 by Pierre Gemayel as a youth 
organization. According to Traboulsi, Gemayel was inspired by the discipline of 
the Hitler youth during the 1936 Olympic Games in Berlin (Traboulsi 2007; 102). 
The Phalange is considered to be part of the Christian Lebanist discourse, with the 
slight modification that they were against the French Mandate, they still 
articulated the Christians as the real Lebanese.  
The Lebanese Front was an alliance between the Phalange Party and the National 
Liberal Party. It was headed by Sulayman Franjiyeh, President of Lebanon 1970-
1976, and by 1976 the President had become synonymous with the Phalange and 
right-winged militias, e.g. the National Liberal Party‟s Tiger militia (Hanf 1993; 
190, Traboulsi 2007: 193). The Phalanges Politbureau January 10, 1976 declared 
that the solution to the dawning civil war was “unity of force and the will of the 
state”, and at the same time claimed that the Lebanese Muslims were weakening 
both (Traboulsi 2007; 193). Similarly the Maronite League had in October 1975 
in a memorandum to the President written “…Lebanon has fallen under real 
occupation (…) All these areas are completely outside the authority of the 
Lebanese state, having fallen under the control of the Palestinian organizations 
and those aiding them, as is known far and wide.” (Memorandum of the Lebanese 
Monastic Orders and the Maronite League to the President of the Republic in 
Cemam 1975; 76 pp.). The ones aiding the Palestinians referred to the Lebanese 
National Movement, a coalition of leftist parties headed by Kamal Jumblat the 
leader of the Progressive Socialist Party, who was connected to the previous 
49 
 
Prime Minister Rashid al-Solh (Cemam reports 1975; 32). Al-Solh was forced to 
resign by pressure of the Phalange in May 1975, because he did not support an 
army intervention against the Palestinians (Resignation statement of Prime 
Minister al-Solh – before the Parliament May 15, 1975 in Cemam 1975; 24).  
In 1977 Bashir Gemayel was granted funds by his father (the founder of the 
Phalange, Pierre Gemayel) to build new military units for the Phalange. Bashir‟s 
new militias became the Lebanese Forces, to some extent overlapping with the 
militias of the Phalange. Between 1980 and 1982 Bashir Gemayel in cooperation 
with the then President Sarkis and the Lebanese army prepared to take over the 
country by military means, and securing complete Christian dominance, 
eradicating any mention of a Muslim-Christian partnership in the constitutional 
documents. In 1982, when Israel informed Bashir that they were going to invade 
Lebanon, Bashir‟s military takeover was planned to take place at the same time. 
Bashir Gemayel was elected president on 23 August 1982
36
, and in his inaugural 
speech it said “it is the first time that the Nation takes charge of the State”, also it 
said that “the war was never a civil war, but a war against Lebanon”. (Traboulsi 
2007; 208, 211, 216) 
These quotes of the Maronite League and Bashir Gemayel illustrate the Christian 
Lebanist discourse represented by the Phalange and Lebanese Forces during the 
civil war. It reveals the discourse as a strong national identity, again defining 
Lebanon as a Christian state; thus the civil war was not about citizens in war with 
other citizens, or a state in war with parts of its citizens, but „foreigners‟ trying to 
undermine the state. Or put differently, people be they Lebanese citizens or not, 
that did not support the Christian state against the threat of the (Muslim) 
Palestinians were defined as foreigners undertaking a war against Lebanon.  
                                                             
36 Bashir Gemayel was elected president by the Chamber as stipulated in the constitution. 
Traboulsi notes that Gemayel was elected through ‘intimidation, terror and buying MPs votes’ 
(Traboulsi 2007; 215) 
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Bashir never gave his inaugural speech, as he was killed a week before the 
inauguration when the Phalange headquarters in east Beirut were blown up
37
. In 
September 1982 Bashir‟s brother, Amin Gemayel, was inaugurated as president, 
again backed by the Israelis. (Ibid) 
 
4.3 Multi-communal Lebanism 
Multi-communal Lebanism problematizes Lebanon as a country where all kinds 
of persecuted minorities have sought refuge from pan-Arabism. The political 
system of Lebanon should therefore ensure religious and ethnic pluralism, while 
protecting Lebanon from becoming arabized - as the opposite of pluralism. This is 
seen as best achieved through a partnership with the Muslim communities and a 
good relation to the neighboring Arab countries. 
The multi-communal Lebanism introduced here, had two phases. The first was 
represented by the Administrative Council
38
 which participated in the negotiation 
over the establishment of Grand Liban, and the second is represented particularly 
by Michel Chiha and Bishara al-Khuri
39
. By the beginning of the civil war multi-
communal Lebanism had slowly been excluded or, more accurately, been 
integrated into Christian Lebanism and Arabism. 
The Administrative Council originally welcomed the French mandate. They 
agreed with the Maronite Patriarch in preventing Lebanon from being 
incorporated into a Syrian federation and on the necessity of expanding Mount 
Lebanon‟s border to create a viable state. (Akarli 1993; 175-176) However, the 
Administrative Council in November 1919 reached a resolution denouncing the 
French intervention into the administration of Mount Lebanon. Among other 
things the resolution stated that the practices of the French military authorities 
                                                             
37 It is not clear who blew up the Phalange Headquarters. The death of Bashir Gemayel was 
blamed on the Palestinians though, and the massacres of Sabra and Shatila can be seen as 
retaliation acts. (Traboulsi 2007; 218) 
38 The Adminstative Council was first established by the Règlement Organique. See section 4.2 
Christian Lebanism. 
39
 Michel Chiha and Bishara Al-Khuri are introduced on page 53. 
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created confusion in all branches of government, weakened it in the eyes of the 
people, dishonored government employees, and revealed disrespect for native 
traditions and institutions. The resolution also stated that even though the 
Administrative Council had itself asked for the help of France, it hoped that it 
would be “une aide réelle augmentat les droits et les prerogatives des Libanais, 
donnant plus d‟autorité et de prestige à leurs fonctions, et ne se transforment pas 
en une domination qui paralyserait leur acion et affaiblirait la dignité du 
Gouvernement libanais
40” (Resolution adopted by the Lebanese Administrative 
Council, 29 November 1919 – Une Resolution du „Conseil Administratif‟ in 
Zamir 1985; 281) In turn, the resolution had little, if any, impact.  
In March 1920, the Syrian government stated that it would recognize Lebanon‟s 
independence and territorial enlargement, if the Lebanese would renounce the 
French mandate. In June 1920 a group of Lebanese councilors, officials and other 
leaders agreed to cooperate with the Syrian government
41
. Their decree of June 
1920, also known as „Le Memorandum des Septs‟, claimed the “complete and 
absolute independence of Mt. Lebanon”, Lebanon‟s political neutrality and that “it 
shall not have an army and it shall not be subject to any military intervention”, or 
territorial enlargement. It also called establishment of a Lebanese-Syrian 
commission to study economic questions between the two countries, and 
cooperation between them. Lastly it stated to have the Allied Powers sanction the 
claims made (Copy of Decree of 10
th
 of June 1920 of the Administrative Council 
of Mt. Leanon in Browne 1976; 9). The group was arrested by the French 
authorities on the road to Damascus, and put before a military court under charges 
                                                             
40
 Roughly translated: ‘a real help taking into consideration the rights and prerogatives of the 
Lebanese, giving more authority and prestige to their positions, and that will not transform into a 
domination that will paralyze action and weaken the dignity of the Lebanese Government” 
41 Of the 13 elected members of the Administrative Council, 7 were with this group: Sa’adallah 
Huwayyik (Maronite, Batrun), Sulaiman Kan’an (Maronite, Jazzin), Khalil ‘Aql (Maronite, Matn), 
Fuad ‘abd al-Malik (Druze, Matn), Mahmoud Junblat (Druze, Shuf), Ilias Shuairi Greek Orthodox, 
Matn), Muhammad Muhsin (Shiite, Kisrawan). Yusuf Baridi (Greek Orhodox, Zahle) supported the 
group, but was at home sick when the others signed the resolution and left for Damascus. Husain 
al-Hajjar (Sunni, Matn) and Niqula Ghusn (Greek Orthodox, Khura) did not participate, but later 
expressed solidarity during the later trials against the group. One position (Maronite, Kisrawan) 
was vacant. Three representatives openly opposed the resolution: Daud Amoun (Maronite, Dair 
al-Qamar), Tawfiq Arslan (Druze, Shuf) and the Chairman of the Council Habib Sa’ad (Maronite). 
(Akarli 1993; 257 note 55, Zamir 1985; Appendix D) 
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of high treason and conspiracy. Subsequently, General Gouraud dissolved the 
Administrative Council all together. (Akarli 1993; 178-180) The establishment of 
„Grand Liban‟ was proclaimed by General Gouraud in Beirut, September 1920.  
The following quote is from a memorandum that one of the councilors, Sulaiman 
Kan‟an (a Maronite), sent to the Conference on the Limitation of Armaments in 
Washington D.C., December 1921: 
“We want to live in peace with our neighbors; but we cannot ever hope to 
do so while there is a foreign power in Syria, for which the majority of 
Mohammedans hold the minority Christians responsible. Thus those who 
come to protect us only arouse against us the enmity of our neighbors. We 
are indeed safer with them, as the past has proven, without this European 
protection (…)True, there is a party of reactionaries among us who, to 
safeguard their interest, still approve of French control: but not little of 
such approval is due to intimidation and coercion on the part of the 
authorities (…) the ambition of France to have a naval base in Syria, and to 
extend her commerce, should not be realized at the expense of a people 
who have always admired her own political and social ideals at home and 
who are now being used as a pretext for occupation. How, in the face of 
this, can we ever live in peace with the Mohammedans of Syria? Let alone, 
we the minority Christians will be in no need of protection; for the 
principal cause of our Neighbors‟ hostility against us will be forever 
removed” (A Request to the Hon. Chairman and Members of the 
Conference on the Limitation of Armament from Mount Lebanon in 
Browne1976)  
Though this quote clearly simplifies the historical relation between Muslims and 
Christians in the region, it does have a point. The large majority of Grand Liban‟s 
Muslim population rejected the French mandate, and many communities grew 
increasingly hostile towards both the French and those that were associated with 
them, i.e. the Christian community. (Traboulsi 2007; 80, Akarli 1992; 177) 
The result of the drawing of the borders led to the following comment of George 
Samné in a series of articles concerning the contradiction between a Christian 
„homeland‟ and the extension of Mount Lebanon‟s borders42: “…ils veulent 
organiser un foyer chrétien, un refuge exempt de charges et de soucis. Mais le 
                                                             
42 Georg Samné was the editor of Correspondance d’Orient and Secretary General of the Comité 
Central Syrien, who supported an independent federal Syria including Lebanon, both for the 
economic benefit of the two, as well as for the independence of the region from the mandatory 
power. (Zamir 1985; 112) 
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Liban de 1921 est un Grand Liban et ne répond plus aux données du problem. On 
compte dans sa population prés de moitié de musulmans. Alors, où est le foyer 
chrétien, puisqu‟un foyer chrétien, puisqu‟un foyer est un endroit où l‟on se 
groupe en famille? Qu‟est ce que‟une famille où l‟on trouve moitié 
d‟étrangers?”43 (Zamir 1985; 113). 
Bishara al-Khuri represented the liberal inter-confessionalist wing that was 
originally defined by the old Administrative Council, however in a modified 
version, due to the exclusion by the French of the council from politics altogether.  
Khuri was prime minister from 1927-29, president candidate in 1932 and 1936, 
and the first president of independent Lebanon 1943-1952
44
. Khuri was 
ideologically connected to Michael Chiha, and his current of opinion was most 
prominently voiced in the daily Le Jour. Chiha (who was not Maronite but 
belonged to the very small Christian Chaldean denomination) is believed to have 
drafted the 1926 Constitution. (Firro 2003; 31, 33) 
The Constitution introduced a bicameral system with a Chamber of Deputies
45
 
(not elected on sectarian basis) and a Senate (Article 22). The senate was to be 
composed of 16 members, whereof 7 were to be chosen by the President and the 
rest publicly elected. Article 96 stipulated that the sects of the senate should be 
divided in the following way: 5 Maronites, 3 Sunnis, 3 Shiites, 2 Greek-Orthodox, 
1 Greek-Catholic, 1 Druze, 1 Minority
46
. Thus the Senate was intended to be the 
“sectarian” chamber. However, the Senate was already abolished in 1927. This 
contributed to the centralization of power with the president, but it also meant that 
the previous non-sectarian chamber became based on sectarian representation 
instead of the Senate. (Constitution Libanaise du 23 Mai 1926)  
                                                             
43 Roughly translated: ‘They want to establish a Christian home - a refuge exempt from attacks 
and worries. But, the Lebanon of 1921 is a ‘Greater Lebanon’ and no longer corresponds to the 
circumstances of the problem. The population counts close to half of it being Muslims. So, where 
is the Christian home, since it is a Christian home, since a home is a place where the family is 
grouped? What is that but a family, where half of it is found to be strangers?’ 
44 Khuri was forced by the opposition (from Phalange, Progressive Socialist party to Syrian Social 
Nationalist Party) to resign as president, partly because of his very liberal economic policy for 
which he was labeled ‘authority without responsibility’ (Traboulsi 2007; 125).  
45 The Chamber of Deputies equals the parliament 
46
 Minority refers to a representative for the different smaller confessional communities not 
included. 
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Alhough multi-communal Lebanism did not survive the civil war in shape of a 
political party, the idea of a non-sectarian chamber of deputies and a sectarian 
senate was reintroduced in the Ta‟if Agreement: Article 22 of the Constitution 
now foresees the establishment of a Senate, as set out in the initial 1926 
Constitution (“Avec l'élection de la première Chambre des députés sur une base 
nationale et non confessionnelle, un Sénat sera créé où seront représentées toutes 
les familles spirituelles; ses attributions seront limitées aux questions nationales 
d'intérêt majeur”47), this has not yet been established, since the confessional 
representation in the Chamber has not been altered by a new electoral law. 
Khuri and Chiha‟s Lebanon was a multi-communal Lebanon, where the position 
of the Christians was ensured through cooperation and power-sharing with the 
Muslim community, rather than repressing it – the same argument that was made 
by Sulaiman Kan‟an in the quote above. This current was not only defined by a 
Christian-Muslim partnership, but also by Lebanon as a mercantile society, where 
Christians and Muslims would be interdependent due to economic ties. (Firro 
2003; 34-35) It is important to note that this multi-communal Lebanism 
underlined Lebanon‟s uniqueness as a melting-pot where all sorts of persecuted 
minorities had found a refuge from pan-Islamism; thereby Lebanon as an Arab 
country was refuted and was rather perceived as Mediterranean:  
“Nous dirons pour notre part avec des arguments plus décisifs encore, que 
la population du Liban est libanaise, tout simplement et que reserve faite 
de naturalizations très récentes, elle n‟est pas plus phénicienne 
qu‟égyptienne, égéenne, assyrienne ou médique, grecque, romaine, 
byzantine, arabe, avec ou sans consanguité, ou européenne par les 
alliances, ou turque par example. Tout au plus dirons-nous qu‟elle est une 
varíeté méditeranéenne probablement la moins déchiffrable. Elle a son 
visage à elle et nul autre. Et l‟on ne pourra pas expliquer le Liban 
d‟aujourd‟hui sans la prendre exactement pour ce qu‟elle est.”48 (Michel 
Chiha
49
 cited in Firro 2003; 35).  
                                                             
47 Roughly translated: With the election of the first Chamber of Deputies on a national basis and 
non-confessional, a Senate will be created where all the spiritual families will be represented; its 
assignments will be limited to questions of national majority interest’ 
48 Roughly translated: ‘we say for our part with decisive arguments, that the population of 
Lebanon is Lebanese, simply, and that conditions resulting from very recent naturalizations 
neither makes Lebanon more Phoenician than Egyptian, Aegean, Assyrian or Median, Greek, 
Roman, Byzantine, Arab, with or without inter-marriage, or European because of its alliances, or 
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The multi-communal Lebanism just as the Christian Lebanism regards Lebanon as 
a historical entity. One is based on a common multi-communal Mediterranean 
past, the other on a Phoenician-Christian past. The following discursive identity of 
Arabism does not perceive Lebanon as a historical entity, but came to accept it as 
a modern one. 
 
4.4 Arabism 
According to Arabism, the problematization of Lebanon was at first to question 
the legitimacy of Lebanon as an independent Christian state, separate from Syria. 
Later, it became to see Lebanon as a country where Muslims had unjustly become 
second-rate to Christians. The solution was not to remove Christians from 
political influence, but to ensure equal representation and influence between the 
two sects. Both are seen as part of an Arab ethnicity that defines Lebanon as a 
country, underlining Arabism as an identity that does not exclude Christians, as 
Arab is not seen as religiously defined by Islam.  
Even the most basic parts of the 1926 Constitution were contested, particularly by 
the Sunni members of the Constitutional assembly; e.g. Article 1 “Le Grand Liban 
est un État unitaire, indépendant.(…)”50. Nevertheless, in the end the full text of 
the Constitution was presented as unanimously agreed upon. (Ziadeh 2006; 90-91, 
86, Constitution Libanaise du 23 Mai 1926) (transl.) In 1921 Muslim 
representatives of the “Coast and four Cazas” in their „Mémorandum de 
protestations des populations des territoires annexés‟ both refuted the historical 
justification for a natural Lebanon, and at the same time made the point that 
Patriarch Elias Huwayyik did not even represent the majority of the Maronites. 
Their main arguments for reintegration into Syria were economic, as especially 
the coastal cities had suffered losses after having been cut off from the Syrian 
interior. (Traboulsi 2007; 81) This current of particularly the Sunni Muslim elite 
                                                                                                                                                                       
Turkish as an example. Even more we say that she is a Mediterranean variety, probably the least 
decipherable. She has her own face, and not another. And, one cannot explain Lebanon today 
without taking her for exactly what she is.’ 
49
 The quote is originally from ‘Liban Aujourd’hui’ by Michel Chiha 1942. 
50
 Roughly translated: ‘Greater Lebanon is a united and independent State…’ 
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has been referred to as the Syrian-Arab nationalists (Firro 2003; 38). As was 
evident from the drawing of the constitution these were more or less completely 
excluded from the designing of the new Lebanese State of Grand Liban. 
Later, a modified version of Syrian-Arab nationalism was politically represented 
during the French Mandate. This is here referred to as „Arabism‟. Arabism 
underlined the common Arabness of both Christians and Muslims in all of Greater 
Syria. The Phoenicians, Assyrians, Arameans, etc. (whom also Michel Chiha 
refers to, see page 45) in this version are all ancestors of the Arabs in Lebanon 
and Syria. Many of the Sunni Muslims that boycotted the constitutional drafting 
were part of this political current, and continued to refer to a pan-Arab unity even 
when they more actively entered Lebanese politics in the 1930s. (Firro 2003; 38-
40) Riad al-Solh was part of this current. He founded the Republican Party for 
Independence, was Prime Minister under Khuri from 1943
51
, and it is in his 
ministerial declaration from October 1943 that the only written form of the 
informal National Pact can be found. (Traboulsi 2007; 98-99, 109)  
The National Pact contained four major principles: 1) it confirmed the power-
sharing formula of article 95 in the Constitution, and that this should be respected 
in both parliament and all high offices of government, 2) it defined Lebanon as a 
“homeland with an Arab face that elects what is sound an beneficial from Western 
civilization” thus making a kind of compromise between the wishes of the Syrian-
Arab nationalists and the Christian allegiance towards France or the West in 
general, 3) as a reassurance especially to Syria, it declared that “We do not want to 
be a safe passage for colonialism against our brethren in the Arab countries” 4) 
last but not least, the National Pact introduced a partnership between President 
Khuri (Maronite) and Prime Minister al-Solh (Sunni), and sectarian quotas in the 
public administration that were supposed to favor Muslim access and thereby 
break the Christian dominance in the public sector apparatus generated before and 
during the French Mandate. (Ziadeh 2006; 110-111, Traboulsi 2007; 110-111)  
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 Riad al-Solh was assassinated in 1951 in Jordan, according to Traboulsi by the Syrian National 
Socialist Party as retaliation for another assassination. (Traboulsi 2007; 123) 
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Though the power-sharing agreement did not become part of the Constitution, but 
was customary practice, it meant that Lebanon from its first independence had 
two constitutional texts: the formal and the informal. Whereas the formal sought 
to continue the Maronite dominance, the informal sought to guarantee especially 
Sunni influence, and determine Lebanon as an Arab country. Though the Pact 
sought to introduce a Maronite-Sunni partnership, the Constitution still gave very 
extensive powers to the President, leaving him unchecked by any authority. Also, 
the President according to the Constitution appointed both the Prime Minister and 
the Cabinet (Ziadeh 2006; 114).  
The Constitution of 1943 was a continuance of Lebanon as a Christian state. As 
context changed however, the discourse of Arabism that had been excluded from 
political life during the French mandate was included through the backdoor
52
. 
This happened because the Multi-communal Lebanism, as represented by Khuri, 
did not exclude Muslims to the extent the previously predominant Christian 
Lebanism had. As the practice of electing a Christian for president was customary, 
and not actually written in the constitution, it was not illogical to make an 
informal appendix to the constitution adding that whereas the president was a 
Christian the Prime minister should be Sunni.  
That Arabism is not a political ideology as such is illustrated by the fact that it 
was capable of integrating two completely different ideologies, namely Liberalism 
(as represented by Riad al-Solh) and socialism (as represented by Kamal Jumblat 
and the Progressive Socialist Party). 
Later versions of Arabism distanced themselves from the National Pact, as their 
errand became secularization. This demand for secularization was based on the 
belief that the National Pact guarded the Christian privileges. In 1975 the Maqasid 
                                                             
52 Troops were deployed by France to counter the independence movement, and the new 
constitution was declared void. It was due to Egypt and the British, who intervened that 
Lebanon’s independence was secured. (Traboulsi 2007; 107-108) This is to note that again 
political identities and their representational potential was partly influenced by foreign politics – 
this however does not mean that Arabism was imposed from the outside while Christian 
Lebanism was oppressed, both were there already, and continued to be so.  
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Graduates
53
 set out a list of basic principles for political reform, e.g. “1. Lebanon 
is an Arab Democratic Republic (..) 7. All Lebanese are equal in rights and 
duties. Consequent on this, it is the right of every Lebanese citizen to occupy any 
post in the Lebanese state including those of President of the Republic, President 
of the Chamber and President of the government.”(Declaration of the Islamic 
Association of Maqasid Graduates on the Causes of the Bloody Events in 
Lebanon in Cemam 1975; 81) 
Kamal Jumblat (Druze) was head of the Progessive Socialist Party
54
 and of the 
Lebanese National Movement
55
. Jumblat, together with Palestinian allies, 
militarily controlled the major part of Lebanese territory by 1976. He was 
however excluded from participating in government though. He sought electoral 
reform and abolishment of the sectarian system. In 1976 the PSP issued a 
declaration of secularism and Arabism:  
“1. The identity of Lebanon is the most distinctive problem around which 
the successive Lebanese crises have revolved (…) 2. Confessionalism has 
prevented the achievement of a unified national identity in Lebanon, and 
because of confessionalism two corresponding nationalisms have emerged 
with two confessional situations: Lebanese Christian Maronite nationalism 
and Arab Islamic nationalism (…) 7. Because secularism faces up to 
confessionalism (…), it is forced to anchor in place a new political and 
social meaning for Arabism which will accomplish the following: a) it will 
do away with the Utopian, emotional, confessional stamp of Arabism (…); 
b) it will remove the complex of fear from the souls of the Christians (…) 
c) it will clear the way for Lebanon – subsequently – to become 
incorporated into a unified Arab state standing on the bases of democracy 
and secularism (…)” (Progressive Socialist Party 1976 in Cemam 1976; 
93-94)  
The PSP thus clearly adhered to the discourse of Arabism integrating Muslims as 
well as Christians. The declaration also clearly defined confessionalism as the 
enemy of the state, be it in the form of Christian Lebanism or Islamic Arabism. 
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 The ‘Maqasid’ was also known as the Muslims Benevolent Society for the Education of Muslim 
Youth. It had a network of schools and an important Beiruti hospital. The Maqasid Graduates 
became politically active around the first years of the civil war, and they especially became 
identified with the left (Cemam 1975; 11).  
54 The Progressive Socialist Party was founded in 1949. 
55 The Lebanese National Movement was composed of the Progressive Socialist party, The 
Lebanese Baath party, the Lebanese Communist Party, the Organization for Communist Action in 
Lebanon, and the Syrian Social Nationalist Party and was founded in 1969. (Hanf 1993; 187) 
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The leftist call for a secular Arabism, and Lebanon as an Arab democratic state 
was backed by the Maqasid Graduates cited above.  
In 1977 Kamal Jumblat was assassinated
56
, and the Lebanese National Movement 
was headed by his son Walid Jumblat, under whom the rhetoric of the movement 
changed to focus less on secular reform and more on Druze identity. After the 
Israeli invasion in 1982 the LNM was dissolved by Walid Jumblat, who continued 
as leader of the Progressive Socialist Party. (Traboulsi 2007; 230) 
 
4.5 Islamic Arabism 
Alongside secular Arabism, Islamic Arabism continued as an identity of its own, 
representing another problematization of Lebanon. 
There has never been a civil personal status law in Lebanon
57
. This is partly due to 
the influence of Islamic Arabism which was mostly represented by the Islamic 
religious institutions. Islamic Arabism has through history at times been difficult 
to separate from a general Arabism, focusing on a pan-Arab unity
58
, e.g. in the 
case of the Syrian-Arab nationalists. The Islamic Arabism did not play a 
significant role in the four constitutional processes as such, as distinguished from 
the political secular version of Arabism. This was due to the general exclusion of 
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 Kamal Jumblat was probably assassinated by allies of Syria, because of his democratic agenda, 
and because he opposed the Syrian intervention against the Palestinians, i.e. that Syria 
intervened on what Jumblat perceived as the wrong side, namely the side of the President. 
(Traboulsi 2007; 204) 
57
 The Constitution states in article art 9 that freedom of conscience is absolute, and that all 
religions are guaranteed the right to freely exercise their faith. Equally it states that all rites, their 
personnel statute and religious interests are guaranteed. The consequence of this last part of 
article 9 is that law concerning personal statute (marriage, divorce, inheritance, etc.) is governed 
by the religious communities themselves, i.e. based on religious prescriptions. (Constitution du 
23 mai 1926) 
58 The socialist and Arab nationalist President Abd al-Nasser in Egypt (1954-1970) influenced this 
political current in Lebanon. Further, the United Arab Republic between Syria and Egypt (1958-
1964) inspired many to Arab nationalism in Lebanon. This was also influenced by the fact that the 
Lebanese president at the time, Sham’un, had endorsed the Baghdad Pact (1955) – an anti-
communist pact between Iraq, Iran, Pakistan and Turkey established on the initiative of USA – to 
the dissatisfaction of many Lebanese. (Traboulsi 2007; 130-131) This is again to say that regional 
and international politics had a great impact on politics in Lebanon; however, both Arabism and 
Islamic Arabism were and had been present as domestic Lebanese identities – that interacted 
with Christian Lebanism, etc. - both before and after.  
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Muslim voices uttering an opinion that did not correspond to either Christian 
Lebanism or Multi-communal Lebanism. When the protagonists of Arabism at the 
beginning of the civil war voiced a demand for not purely political secularization, 
but also for a secularization of the civil status law, the Sunni council of Ulama
59
 
wrote:  
“What then could be the intent of uttering a call for secularism other than 
allowing the marriage of a Muslim girl with a non-Muslim? Those who 
head the call for secularism intend precisely (…) to break down the last 
and only barrier which protects Muslims in Lebanon from the dangers of 
dissolution, disintegration, and delusion to which they are exposed with 
persistent duress from the secularism of both the Westerners and the 
Marxist alike …” (Declaration of the Council of Ulama in Lebanon on 
Secularization March 25 1976 in Cemam 1976; 90) 
Also the Christian political leadership with its targeting of the Muslims was 
commented upon:  
“We know that whenever the Maronite leaders in this country propose 
secularization as a political solution to the ordeal, their aim is to entice the 
Muslims to reject it and thus gain two tactical goals for their confessional 
community: the first is to put the responsibility for the failure of dialogue 
on the Muslims; the second is to get Islamic forces to fight secularization 
and thereby aid Christian interests.” (Declaration of the Council of Ulama 
in Lebanon on Secularization March 25 1976 in Cemam 1976; 85) 
And the Sunni mufti during the Ramadan in 1975 said during a sermon:   
“We call upon God to give unity to the Arabs and guide their chiefs on the 
road of honor to victory over their enemies, that Arab Palestinian rights 
which have been robbed may be recovered. May he inspire the Arabs to 
help Lebanon to remain far from those struggles, and continue to play its 
constructive role within Lebanon in the interest of Arabs and Arabism 
everywhere.” (Sermon of Mufti October 5 1975 in Cemam 1976; 67) 
Islamic Arabism is understood as an identity defined by its perception of demands 
for secularization as a Christian strategy to further dominate the Muslims of 
Lebanon, and as a sign of disintegration, and corruption of the Muslim identity. 
Further, the Christian leaders are perceived as the main threat to Islamic Arabism, 
and this is based on a general reading of European culture and socialism as a 
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 Ulama means the learned of Islam, this refers especially to Islamic law, but also theology, 
philosophy, etc. 
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threat to religious, particularly Islamic, identity. Therefore, at the start of the civil 
war there was a strong antagonism between Islamic Arabism and Christian 
Lebanism.  
Hezbollah founded in 1982 drew heavily on this discourse, as well as the 
following of the Movement of the Deprived. This is elaborated in the section 
below.  
 
4.6 The Movement of the Deprived 
“We are neither of the right nor of the left, but we follow the path of the just (…) 
He who sleeps while having a needy neighbor is not considered a believer.” 
(Cemam reports 1974; 111).  
The founder of the Movement of the Deprived
60
 was Imam Musa- al-Sadr, who 
stated the above words. The essence of this identity was liberation of the Shiite 
community, especially in the South of Lebanon, from elite domination and 
general political exclusion. This was not framed in sectarian terms necessarily but 
referred to all of those deprived in their country:  
“Let them give weapons to the man in the South, and let them know that 
there are, in this country, pampered sons and sons of housemaids; a 
privileged region and a disinherited region. We want justice for all and the 
defense of all because we are, to all appearances, part of a region which is 
classified, with its inhabitants, in the third category. We have no other 
choice except revolution and arms…” (Imam Musa Al-Sadr speech in 
Yatir February 1974 in cemam Reports 1974; 117)  
The Shiite were marginalized with regard to their political communal 
representation, because the other national identities of Lebanon were dominated 
by Sunni Muslims and different Christian communities. Many Shiite were 
members of the communist parties, e.g. the Syrian Socialist National Party and the 
Lebanese Communist Party, who condemned the tribal, ethnic, and religious bases 
for discrimination. The majority of Shiites continued to support these parties also 
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 In this context the Movement of the Deprived is not referred to exclusively as the concrete 
movement, but also as a discourse which later political leaders were to be influenced by. 
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after the establishment of the Movement of the Deprived (Norton 2007; 15, 20). 
But, it was not until Musa al-Sadr‟s Movement of the Deprived that a strong 
Shiite identity became politically influential. The Shiite were given the post of 
speaker of Parliament in the National Pact 1943, but were not legally recognized 
as a Muslim community separate from the Sunni until 1967, when the Supreme 
Islamic Shiite Council was established. Before then the Sunni Mufti of Lebanon 
had been the representative of all Muslims. Musa al-Sadr was elected president 
for the Supreme Islamic Shiite Council in 1969. (Cemam reports 1974; 107-109) 
The quote below is from a speech given in the context of a general strike, 
observed throughout the country, organized by the Imam to protest against “the 
negligence and disregard shown towards the problems of South of Lebanon”. A 
week after the speech was given the Council of the South was established under 
the Planning Ministry to guide funds to the development of the Southern region. 
(Cemam 1974; 109-110) 
“South Lebanon is a strategic area which must be fortified to protect 
Lebanon. But Lebanon is neglected by its own government (…). The 
inhabitants of the South Lebanon do not feel that the state defends the 
security of their areas (…) Matter have come to such a point that we feel 
we are a burden to our country; we appear despicable in our own eyes, for 
we are no longer full citizens” (Imam Musa Al-Sadr Speech in Beirut 1974 
in Cemam Reports 1974; 109) 
The Amal militia was officially created in June 1975, as the military wing of the 
Movement of the Deprived (Hanf 1993; 189). Amal who had first supported LNM 
in their struggle for reform, by 1976 supported president Franjiyeh in an attempt 
to maintain Shiite neutrality. From 1980 Amal was headed by Nabih Berri
61
 who 
like al-Sadr was in strong opposition to the sectarian system with its elite-
privileges, and at the same time opposed the armed Palestinian presence in 
Lebanon. Unlike Sadr, Berri was part of the lay middle class, not a cleric.  
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 In 1978 Musa al-Sadr disappeared during a journey to Libya. His disappearance has never been 
solved, some rumors have it that he was assassinated by orders of Gadaffi (Norton 2007; 21) 
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Hezbollah was formed in 1982
62
, succeeding the Israeli invasion. Ehud Barak 
later stated that “When we entered Lebanon (…) there was no Hezbollah. We were 
accepted with perfumed rice and flowers by the Shia in the South. It was our 
presence that created Hezbollah” (Ehud Barak 2006 in Norton 2007). Whether it 
was solely Israel‟s invasion that created Hezbollah is doubtful, however it is clear 
that the Israelis provided a context for Hezbollah‟s popular support. Hezbollah, 
who in their manifest of 1985 proclaimed the USSR to be as arrogant as the USA, 
attacked both all western presence in the country as well as the leftist 
organizations. The role model was the 1978-79 Iranian Revolution, and Hezbollah 
was supported by Iran from the very start, as well as by, a slightly more 
ambivalent, Syria. (Norton 2007; 33, 36) Hezbollah drew on both The Movement 
of the Deprived and on Islamic Arabism. Their program from 1985 is addressed to 
the “Downtrodden in Lebanon and in the world”, and it read “We address all the 
Arabs and Islamic peoples to declare to them that the Muslim‟s experience in 
Islamic Iran left no one any excuse since it proved beyond all doubt that bare 
chests motivated by faith are capable, with God‟s help, of breaking the iron and 
oppression of tyrannical regimes.” (Norton 2007; 35-36).  
After the civil war Hezbollah focused less on Islamic Arabism (as will be evident 
from the second part of the analysis). The shared identity of Amal and Hezbollah 
is based on the initial rhetoric of Musa al-Sadr. Both parties later came to stray 
from their condemnation of sectarian politics, as they themselves became engaged 
as political actors. However, both have gained their initial support through the 
discourse initiated by Sadr, and they are both still identifying with „the deprived‟. 
- The deprived referring to the poor Lebanese, especially in the South; and 
especially the Shiite. Last but not least, they both continued the rhetoric of Al-
Sadr in terms of „if the state does not protect its people, the people must protect 
themselves‟ that the two above quotes of Sadr express. 
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 Hezbollah emerged in 1982, but was not properly consolidated as an organization until the 
mid-1980s.   
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4.7 In- and exclusions of identities
63
 
In 1920, Grand Liban was formed of a larger territory than even the Maronite 
Church had originally asked for. There proved to be a trade-off between creating 
an independent Christian state and creating an independent and viable economic 
unit, at the same time as General Gouraud favored partitioning Syria
64
 into big 
entities: “It will be easy to maintain a balance among three or four Syrian states 
that will be large enough to achieve 
self-sufficiency and, if need 
be, pit one against the 
other”, wrote the General in 
a memorandum to his 
superiors (Traboulsi 2007; 
85). The quote illustrates the 
policy of „divide and rule‟ 
that the French were blamed 
for exerting under their 
Mandate, like the Ottomans 
before them. This policy can 
be seen as a logic of difference, breaking down chains of equivalence to prevent 
the subjects identifying with these from articulating demands and needs into a 
generalized challenge to the dominant regime (Howarth and Glynos 2007; 145).  
 
This logic contributed to keeping groups in Lebanon separate; e.g. separating the 
predominantly Sunni Muslims of the four cazas (Syrian-Arab nationalists) from 
the Administrative Council (Multi-communal Lebanism) that could have posed 
the threat of an independent Lebanon with close political and economical ties to 
an independent Syria. Therefore, the main Lebanese actor dealing with the French 
                                                             
63 The two following sections are based, primarily, on the sources jut reviewed on the preceding 
pages.  
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 With Syria is here intended Syria as defined under the French Mandate, that is excl. Lebanon. 
See map above. 
Lebanon and the four Syrian states (Traboulsi 2007; 89) 
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continued to be the Maronite Church, supporting the French Mandate, as this was 
fully compatible with the aspiration for a Christian state.  
With the establishment of Grand Liban three main political currents were created: 
1) Maronite Church proclaiming Lebanon a Christian refuge, 2) the 
Administrative Council drawing on League of Nations rhetoric of minority rights 
and the right to self-determination, and 3) the Muslim, predominantly Sunni, 
conference of the four cazas that was in opposition to Lebanon as an independent 
state in its new form, partly for economic reasons, and partly in opposition to 
being incorporated into a „Christian state‟.  
Contestations of the idea of Lebanon as a country divided between two universal 
and conflicting identities of Muslim and Christian have been present throughout 
history. These contestations however, have been excluded repeatedly. The 
constitution of 1926 excluded the Syrian-Arab nationalist discourse completely, as 
this contested Lebanon‟s very existence as a state; a claim that was not based on 
aspiration for Muslim dominance over a Christian minority, but on a sense of 
belonging to Syria, with trade and cultural ties that were already strong. It also 
partly excluded the liberal inter-confessionalist wing as represented by the 
Administrative Council. After the dissolution of the Administrative Council in 
1920, many of the ideas they represented (rights of minorities, right of peoples to 
self-determination, pluralism) came to be represented by Michel Chiha who 
participated in the drafting of the constitution. The multi-communal Lebanism of 
Michel Chiha was a rearticulation of the position of the Administrative Council. 
The two main new features of the multi-communal Lebanism were that the claim 
for independence from France was no longer explicit and that the „Arab‟ identity 
was pictured as in opposition to a multi-communal identity, which was instead 
defined as Mediterranean. In short, the exclusion of these two political currents 
from participating in the constitutional drafting meant that the idea of Lebanon as 
an independent (democratic) Arab state was inconceivable. - The reason being 
that Christian Lebanism, the discourse which the French perceived as the „Real 
Lebanon‟, pictured a Lebanon without French protection, as a Lebanon where the 
Christians would be massacred or at least oppressed. And, the multi-communal 
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Lebanism pictured an Arab Lebanon as a mono-communal Lebanon. The Arab 
Lebanon, and especially the Muslim Arab Lebanon, therefore became the anti-
identity of Lebanon under the French mandate. 
Arabism as a rearticulated version of the Syrian-Arab nationalist identity became 
acceptable by the end of the Mandate and was included in the National Pact. This 
was possible as the Muslim-Christian Arabism did not question Lebanon as an 
entity, and pictured the Arab identity not as mono-communal, but as bi-
communal. A partnership with the multi-communal Lebanism was thus possible, 
opposing Christian Lebanism that articulated Muslims rather as non-Christians 
than as Muslims. This Arab identity of Lebanon was however only included 
informally, still preserving the extreme centralization of power with the Christian 
president. 
Both during the French Mandate and after the Lebanese independence, no Shiite 
voices, as such, were present. The universal identities of Christian and Muslim 
were represented mainly by the elites of Maronite Christians and the Sunni 
Muslims. Framing the parliamentary system in sectarian terms defined by Muslim 
and Christian thus had the effect of excluding both Christian and Muslim 
denominations, other than Maronite and Sunni. When the Christian-Muslim 
hierarchy was turned upside down after the civil war (see below) this exclusion of 
denominations still persisted; the strong Shiite identity revolving around 
Hezbollah and Amal illustrates this.  
The Shiite denomination and the Islamic Arabism were excluded because they 
each represented an opposition to the Muslim identity defined as Sunni, and the 
Islamic religious subject that was the antagonism of Christian Lebanism, 
respectively. Therefore, both of these identities were based on the same religious 
subject as the other identities, but they challenged how to fix the meaning of that 
religious subject. 
The Administrative Council and the leftist parties before the civil war challenged 
the religious subject. However, in the long term this challenge never took the 
shape of an actual discursive contestation of the religious subject, because these 
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opinions were incorporated into other discursive identities, rather than forming 
their own. Rather, the demand for secularization became a way of asserting the 
unjust treatment of one‟s own confessional community, and not the basis for 
identification based on a non-religious subject. 
 
4.8 Iterability - The Head of State  
The Christian identity of the Maronite Church that was defined by a Muslim-
Christian opposition was the point of departure for the first constitutional text of 
the Règlement Organique. The prevalent political subject was thereby defined as 
Christian. The Règlement Organique marks the beginning of a way of dealing 
with civil strife as sectarian strife; this is considered to have its origin in the 
decades leading up to the massacre of 1860 and to have become a more 
formalized approach with the Règlement Organique.  
It is this relation of conflict between sects that is still object for iterability; the 
continued repetition and modification of the religiously defined political subject. 
The development of a primary Christian subject as justification for a Lebanese 
state, which took off with the Règlement Organique, was embodied in the figure 
of the President in 1926. The institution of a primary Christian subject was located 
in the problematization of Lebanon as a territory characterized by religious 
conflict, where the Christians without foreign protection would be massacred.  
The relation between the Christian and Muslim communities was modified in the 
National Pact. It contributed to securing the Sunni Muslim community an 
influential post, but it also further institutionalized the sectarian representation. 
This is because sectarian representation was again affirmed as a natural logic of 
representation. In other words, the progress in the National Pact was seen in terms 
of the Muslim and Christian communities being more equally represented, while 
the question of representing the population in other terms was not part of the 
negotiation. The Lebanese subject that had first been articulated as Christian 
(1861), and again affirmed as such in 1926, was now modified to also being a 
Muslim subject. This was based on the same logic of representation; affirming the 
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Lebanese subject as religiously defined. The interpretation of the Constitution that 
was offered in the National Pact did three things: 1) It continued and affirmed the 
customary practice of having a Christian Head of State, 2) It modified the 
representation of the Muslim community in that it secured the post as head of 
government for a Sunni Muslim, and the (less influential) post as speaker of 
parliament for a Shiite Muslim, 3) Based on the above it modified the Christian 
subject into a religious subject and institutionalized a sectarian practice, not 
included in the Constitution.  
The national pact can therefore be seen as simultaneous continuity and 
discontinuity of the sectarian logic of representation, initially based on the 
predominance of the Christian subject. 
The preamble added to the constitution in 1991 defines Lebanon as “arabe dans 
son identité et son appartenance”65, as a democratic republic that respects the 
political and civil rights of the individual and that is based on a liberal economic 
system. It underlines the importance of an equal regional development as 
important for the stability of the country and further states that “La suppression du 
confessionnalisme politique constitue un but national essentiel pour la réalisation 
duquel il est nécessaire d'oeuvrer suivant un plan par étapes”66. (Constitution 
Libanaise du 23 Mai 1926, Préambule ajouté par la loi constitutionnelle du 
21/9/1991) The mentioning of equal regional development can be seen as a trace 
of the Movement of the Deprived-identity that through Amal and Hezbollah 
played a central role during the civil war. The Ta‟if formalized the identity of 
Arabism as the primary Lebanese identity. Thereby, the hierarchy between 
Muslims and Christians has been turned on its head
67
. In that sense it represents a 
discontinuity. However, it is still the objectivity of the religious subject – first 
instituted through the dominant identity of Christian Lebanism – that is the 
                                                             
65 Roughly translated: ‘Arab in its identity and belonging‘. 
66 Roughly translated: ’The suppression of political confessionalism is an essential national goal, 
the realization of which will necessitate working according to a plan divided in stages.’  
67 Following Derrida, this is to say that Muslim and Christian never constituted an actual 
difference, but rather a hierarchy. As Derrida writes: “…an opposition of metaphysical concepts 
(for example, speech-writing, presence-absence, etc.) is never the face-to-face of two terms, but a 
hierarchy and an order of subordination.” (Derrida 1972; 108) 
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underlying rationale for the division of power. And, in that sense it represents 
continuity.  
The custom of electing a Maronite Christian as president, a Sunni Muslim as 
Prime Minister, and a Shiite Muslim as speaker of the Chamber of Deputies (the 
so called „three presidents‟), is still based on the customary practice initiated by 
the 1943 National Pact. However, the strong position of the president was broken 
with the new division of power according to the Ta‟if Agreement, the emphasis 
now being on the role of the Prime Minister. E.g. the Prime Minister represents 
the government, countersigns presidential decisions and liaises with the President 
in the conduct of international negotiations (article 52 2.), and the right of 
initiative lies with the Chamber of Deputies and the Ministerial Cabinet (article 
18). 
It is crucial for an understanding of the current political system that abolishing 
sectarianism is mentioned in the constitution, while the previous customary 
practice of the three sectarian „Presidents‟ is upheld.   
The National Pact and the constitutional amendment according to the Ta‟if 
agreement formalized the move from a primarily Christian subject to a religious 
subject, even though the Ta‟if stipulated to abolish sectarianism. This is because 
the division of power in the Constitution is still interpreted according to the 
National Pact, thereby increasing the power of the Prime Minister vis-à-vis the 
President means increasing the power of the Sunni „president‟ vis-à-vis the 
Christian „president‟.   
Political representation in practice is still based on the Christian-Muslim divide, 
but at the same time the informal division of the three presidents recognizes a 
difference between Sunni and Shiite Muslims. The main continuity/discontinuity 
in this arrangement is that the Muslim-Christian opposition is maintained in the 
formal constitution, while it is now the (Sunni) Muslim representation that is most 
prominently embodied in the role of the Prime Minister, as guaranteed by the 
informal constitution.  
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4.9 Conclusion - A hegemonic logic of representation 
Five discursive identities have been presented: 1. Christian Lebanism that 
problematizes Lebanon as a site of religious conflict and is seen as a historically 
Christian entity that has been arabized against its will; 2. Multi-communal 
Lebanism that problematizes Lebanon as a country where all kinds of persecuted 
minorities have sought refuge from pan-arabism. Pluralism is seen as best 
achieved through a partnership between the Christian and Muslim communities 
and a good relation to the neighboring Arab countries; 3. the problematization of 
Lebanon, according to Arabism, is as a country where Muslims unjustly became 
second-rate to Christians. The solution was to ensure equal representation and 
influence between the two sects that are both seen as Arab, because Arabism is 
not necessarily religiously defined by Islam; 4. Islamic Arabism is understood as 
an identity defined by its perception of any demands for secularization as a 
Christian strategy to further dominate the Muslims of Lebanon, and as a sign of 
disintegration and corruption of the Muslim identity; 5. the Movement of the 
Deprived problematizes Lebanon as a country ruled by the privileged, neglecting 
the poor; the poor mainly being the population of the South, who are mainly 
Shiite.  
All five identities relate to the logic of representation, based on the citizen defined 
by the religious subject position. 
The sectarian logic of representation is problematic because it institutes the 
religious subject as universal. At the same time the religious subject becomes the 
most important floating signifier that political parties try to fix the meaning of, in 
terms of different readings of sect and denomination. The religious subject is 
therefore a continuing antagonizing element at the heart of the Lebanese political 
system. And, it has been institutionalized as such through formal and informal 
political practices revolving around the constitutional development.  
The sectarian logic of representation is seen as hegemonic because it institutes the 
religious subject as something objectively defined. Whoever fixes the meaning of 
the religious subject holds the key to the power. This hegemonic logic represents a 
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certain problematization of Lebanon: namely that of conflict as based in religious 
dispute, and thereby the political sectarian differentiation as a solution to conflict. 
The social field criss-crossed with antagonisms that this hegemonic logic operates 
in, is the different identities that are constituted by logic of equivalence: 
All the presented discursive identities disagree over the history of Lebanon and 
what the effects of it should be in the politics of Lebanon at a given time. They are 
also clearly positioned vis-à-vis one another. Both Christian Lebanism and multi-
communal Lebanism depict the Muslim Arab world as a threat. The multi-
communal Lebanism however, does not favor the Christian religion as such over 
the Muslim religion in Lebanon. Rather, it favors Lebanon as part of the Western 
world, instead of as part of the Arab world. Whereas the multi-communal 
Lebanism tries to unite the Lebanese in a Mediterranean commonness, Arabism 
tries to unite in an Arab commonness. It thus distances itself from the Christian 
Lebanism, in that in insists on a Muslim-Christian unity and thereby rejects 
Christian predominance. Additionally, it distances itself from multi-communal 
Lebanism in that it insists on the common Arabness of both Lebanese and Syrians, 
Christians and Muslims, and thereby rejects the Mediterranean identity. Islamic 
Arabism is the binary antagonistic identity of Christian Lebanism. The Movement 
of the Deprived opposes the old privileged communities, meaning that it is in 
opposition to both Christian Lebanism and Arabism.  
Although some of the five identities were excluded historically, they have still 
gained some leverage before and after the civil war by referring to their universal 
right as sect, or denomination. The secular subject therefore represents the identity 
that has been pushed to the margins of the Lebanese society, i.e. fully excluded, as 
it would subvert the “objective” logic of the political system. - It would institute 
an entirely different basis for accessing political power.  
Based on this it is conjectured
68
 that this particular problematization increases the 
long-term conflict potential of the Lebanese political system.  
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5. Maintaining and contesting the sectarian logic of 
representation after Ta’if - The continued dislocation of 
representation 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter focuses on the continuing hegemony of the sectarian logic of 
representation in the Lebanese political system. Though the Ta‟if agreement 
clearly stated to abolish sectarianism as a national goal, and though this is now 
part of the preamble to the Lebanese constitution, the most central issues of the 
election campaigns in 2009, and the new election law reinforce the same logic of 
representation as before. That this logic of representation is a dislocation is 
illustrated by examples of a secular identity contesting the religious subject 
position as the primary or only subject position in politics.   
 
5.2 Maintaining and contesting the Muslim-Christian divide 
5.2.1 Maintenance 
The Chamber of Deputies elected on a sectarian basis, is according to the Ta‟if 
Agreement invested with the responsibility of agreeing on a new election law that 
will establish a non-sectarian Chamber, and a sectarian Senate (the latter only 
invested with powers to deal with “questions nationals d‟intérêt majeur”, 
Constitution art. 22). With the Ta‟if, the sectarian system therefore became the 
exception before the establishment of national unity and the solution to conflict at 
the same time. As Speaker of Parliament Nabih Berri put it in January 2010 after 
the establishment of the current government: “The Constitution since its 
establishment considered political sectarianism an exception and this exception 
turned into a reality 83 years later; however, we should not build a rule upon an 
exception” (Daily Star 14.01, 2010). The national committee for abolishing 
sectarianism (as set out in the Ta‟if Agreement Chapter II G) has been discussed 
since 1992, but never actually established (Daily Star 14.01, 2010) On the 
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contrary, maintaining the sectarian system has been practiced as a solution to 
conflict, an example is the new election law that was adopted in Doha in 2008.  
In 2005 the Boutros Commission
69
 was established and assigned the task of 
drafting a new election law. However, the draft law of the Boutros Commission 
was shelved until 2008 due to the crisis in Lebanese politics and the Israeli war
70
. 
When a new electoral law was finally adopted in Doha it introduced important 
measures to insure a fairer and more transparent electoral process than before, but 
it failed to address the essential problematic of the Lebanese logic of 
representation
71
.  
The following section presents a central issue in the new election law which 
contributes to the maintenance of the sectarian logic of representation: 
The strictly majoritarian system
72
 was maintained and new smaller electoral 
districts were introduced. Due to the system previous to 2008 many Christian 
deputies in parliament were elected by Muslim voters, because little over half of 
                                                             
69 The members of the Commission were: Fouad Boutos (President), Nawaf Salam (Secretary 
General), Ghaleb Mahmassani,  Michel Tabet, Arda Ekmekji, Zuhair Shekr, Ghassan Abou Elewan, 
Ziyad Baroud, Abdul-Salam Chouaib, Fayez Hajj Chahine, Paul Salem, Khaldoun Naja (NCEL 
homepage). In August 2005, the government appointed a National Commission for a New 
Electoral Law, comprised of academics, lawyers, and civil society activists, under the 
chairmanship of Fouad Boutros. In collaboration with the United Nations Development Program 
and various domestic and international NGOs, the Boutros Commission formulated a draft law 
outlining an array of electoral reforms (Berti 2009).  
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 In 2006 the Israel 34 days war in Lebanon took place between Hezbollah and the Israeli 
Defense Forces. Subsequently Hezbollah, Amal and the Free Patriotic Movement withdrew from 
government (6 ministers), and demanded the resignation of the government. The crisis escalated 
to armed confrontation in May 2008 (May 7th e.g. see 
http://www.nowlebanon.com/NewsArchiveDetails.aspx?ID=92231 ), when Hezbollah reacted to 
a government attempt to shut down its communication network by seizing parts of West Beirut 
controlled by Sunni militiamen loyal to the late Rafiq Hariri's Future Movement. To solve the 
conflict, the parties met in Doha, Qatar, and agreed to the formation of national unity 
government, a compromise candidate for president (current President Michel Suleiman), and "to 
examine and discuss" the Boutros Commission draft law (Berti 2009, EU 2009; 6-7).  
71 Logic of representation: refers to conclusion of the first part of the analysis 
72
 The Lebanese electoral system is a majoritarian system based on ‘block-vote’ (i.e. voters have 
more than one vote and can vote for as many candidates as there are seats available. The 
candidates with the highest number of votes win the seats even if none gain more than 50%). In 
Lebanon this means that candidates come together to form a single list so that one candidate’s 
supporters can benefit another. Thus, each list wants the supporters of its different candidates to 
vote as a ‘block’ as whichever list has the highest number of votes is likely to win all seats in that 
district. The system means that there is little relationship between the number of seats won in 
Parliament and proportion of the national share of the vote. (IFES 2009) 
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the Christian seats (38 out of 64) were in electoral districts with a majority of 
Muslim voters
73
. After the 2005 elections, parts of the Christian block complained 
about this. Even though it should be a positive feature of the Lebanese electoral 
system that candidates have to appeal to voters across confession, there was in 
2005 a clear tendency for various electorates to maintain a confessional voting 
pattern (EU 2005; 34). As a consequence of this and the Christian complaints, the 
new electoral law therefore increased the number of electoral districts from 14 to 
26 (EU 2009; 11, Electoral Law 2008; annex), in such a way that 13 districts are 
now mono-confessional (eight are Christian districts and five are Muslim 
districts), in all 47 Christian seats are now in Christian majority districts as 
opposed to 37 in the old system
74
 (DRI and LADE 2008; 21-23, Electoral Law 
2008; annex). In essence, instead of counteracting a tendency to confessional 
voting, this tendency was given in to and enforced administratively. This was 
done to ensure that most Christian candidates would be elected by Christian 
voters. 
These new districts maintain the logic of sectarian representation in two very 
concrete ways:  
1. The sectarian nature of the parliamentary system is increased as representatives 
to a higher degree are now directly representing confessional votes. To compare 
this with e.g. quota for women, following the same logic would mean that female 
candidates were expected to be elected primarily by female voters directly, and 
that this was administratively promoted.  
2. As seats in the parliament are divided equally between Christians and Muslims, 
but Christian voters only constitute approximately 40% of all registered voters 
(DRI and LADE 2008; 19), the new districts have the effect that a Christian vote 
weighs more than a Muslim vote, because a Christian seat in Parliament 
                                                             
73 As the seats in Parliament are required to be shared equally between Christian and Muslim 
representatives, following the 1991 Constitution, and there has to be an equal regional 
representation, Muslim districts will also have to elect Christian candidates - and the other way 
around.  
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 The total number of seats was also increased to 128. 
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represents less voters. This is contrary to the basic principle of one person one 
vote.  
The threat articulated in this election law is Muslim dominance over the Christian 
community. The election law in this way presents a clear-cut example of 
maintaining the Christian identity as defined in opposition to „Muslims‟. Further, 
it is an example which produces very material effects in terms of regulating voting 
behavior. The adoption of the election law maintains the historical trace of 
responding to conflict by increasing sectarian control; the new election law 
overruled the moderating suggestions of the Boutros Commission‟s draft law75. 
Thus, overcoming an open conflict was again done by reference to the sectarian 
logic; the conflict was partly overcome by guaranteeing protection of one sect 
against another despite the fact that basic principles of democratic representation 
were undermined. Referring to the reform of the election law Michel Aoun said 
during his electoral campaign (addressing a mainly Christian public in Beirut, 
Achrafieh): “what right is greater than that of speaking out and electing your 
representatives freely? This is an acquired right that should not be taken from 
you. They wanted to take it from you to keep you divided as you were under the 
previous electoral law.” (Aoun, May 28 2009). The sectarian representation in 
this way is articulated as a democratic guarantee, whereas the actual one 
person/one vote representation is portrayed as a threat to democracy. Democracy 
in this way rhetorically becomes equal to the sectarian power-sharing system.  
5.2.2 Contestation 
In the ministerial decision of August 8, 2005 establishing the National 
Commission on Parliamentary Law (The Boutros Commission) it is stated that:  
“The government believes that it would be possible for multi-sectarian political 
groups to be created provided that an appropriate electoral system would be put in 
place. It also believes that sectarian plurality would not prevent the formation of 
modern parties allowing abolition of traditional sectarianism that has destroyed 
our political life and hindered its development.” (National Commission on 
Parliamentary Electoral Draft Law 2006)   
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Establishing the Boutros Commission was thus based on the Ta‟if Agreement 
clause C and the Constitution art. 24 that both refer to „abolishing sectarianism‟.  
The wording of the ministerial decision refers to „traditional sectarianism‟. 
Traditional sectarianism, however, as this paper argues actually refers to modern 
sectarianism; i.e. a conflict created along with the development of the state that 
deploys the religious subject position as the only subject position possible to 
represent politically. It is not clear from the ministerial decision what the actual 
difference is between sectarian plurality and traditional sectarianism. Therefore, 
even though the decision is based on the paragraph of the Ta‟if stating the need to 
abolish sectarianism, this challenge to sectarianism is still influenced by the 
dominating idea that there is good and bad sectarianism; modern and traditional.   
The objectives of the reform of the electoral law were defined by the Boutros 
Commission itself as set out in the Ta‟if: “Safeguarding of coexistence; Fair 
political representation of all groups and generations; Effectiveness of 
representation; Preservation of the unity of land, people and institutions” 
(NCPEDL 2006a; chap. 3.b). Further, the commission stated 3 political criteria for 
the draft law. In short, and in the words of the Commission, these were: a) To 
move away from formulae that might lead to a permanent consolidation of 
sectarianism, b) To seek to give the draft law a constructive dynamism that would 
make, with time, the national discourse prevail over the religious or sectarian 
one, and c) To protect any Lebanese community from the danger of being 
dominated by another one (NCPEDL 2006a; chap. 3.2). 
Thereby the Boutros Commission itself diverted from the rhetoric of the 
government that established it, in that it saw sectarianism as one united 
phenomenon that needed to be changed. The draft law of the Boutros commission 
therefore did not suggest modern sectarianism as opposed to traditional 
sectarianism, but a gradual abolishment of sectarianism all together. The draft law 
of the Boutros Commission therefore constitutes a secular contestation of 
sectarianism as a solution to conflict; it contests the „old‟ problematization of 
Lebanon, and offers a new one.   
77 
 
It is impossible to say what would have happened to the draft law had it not been 
for the escalating crisis
76
. However, the argument of this paper is that the law did 
not survive the conflict because the discourse of sectarianism was prevalent; i.e. 
the outcome of Doha was another example of practicing sectarianism as a 
response to conflict. Therefore the draft law contesting this basic logic of the 
system could not be agreed upon.   
The previous election law set out a majoritarian system, based on block voting
77
. 
Combined with the lack of campaign and media regulations as well as a lack of 
uniform voting ballots, this was seen to promote the creation of the two distinctive 
blocks of March 14 and March 8 in the 2005 election both by election monitors 
and the Boutros Commission. Democracy Reporting International and the 
Lebanese Association for Democratic Elections documented that more than 20% 
of all candidates won their parliamentary seat uncontested, as opponents gave up 
competition beforehand. A grim example of this took place in the Baabda-Aley 
district where the opposing March 14 group and Hezbollah promoted a combined 
list of candidates which won all the seats; thus ensuring a certain number of seats 
for each side, Sunni on one and Shiite on the other. (DRI and LADE 2008; 13, 20, 
21) To counter this development, the Commission suggested a two-string system 
based on both majoritarian and proportional principles
78
: out of the 128 deputies 
77 were to be elected in 27 small electoral districts, cadas, according to the 
majoritarian system, and 51 were to be elected in six large districts, muhafazat, 
according to the proportional system. Confessional quotas still applied to both 
types of constituencies. (Parliamentary electoral draft law 2006; art. 29, 30) The 
deputies elected in the small cadas are thus elected by votes obtained on an 
individual basis, deputies elected in the large muhafazat are elected by votes 
obtained by their list as a whole (NCPEDL 2006a; chap. 3). 
The draft law, based on the above, sought to enhance the principle of one person 
one vote, and encourage cross-sectarian voting. By creating the new 
                                                             
76 See note 70 above 
77 See note 72 above 
78 The two-tier system suggested is a mixed member electoral system and is inspired by Shugart 
and Wattenberg 2001 ‘Mixed-Member Electoral Systems – The Best of Both Worlds?’ (See for 
example page 9-24).  
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administrative units it sought to increase political contestation between and within 
parties, and breaking the tendency to block-formation. These suggestions contest 
the very narrow understanding of the Muslim-Christian representation where 
Muslims directly represent Muslims, and Christians directly represent Christians. 
The draft law tried to make confessionalism secondary, and political contestation 
not based on sectarian logics primary. This new election law could thus have 
prepared the ground for new chains of equivalence by including the possibility of 
potential representation of other identities. 
 
5.3 Fronts in the 2009 election 
The rhetoric in the electoral campaign shows that apart from the sectarian and 
denominational identities that were well established after the civil war, there is a 
new equivalential identity constructed around the events of the Cedar Revolution. 
The antagonism consists of March 14 and March 8. The coalitions were created in 
2005, after then Prime Minister Rafik Hariri was assassinated on February 14. On 
March 8, 2005 a demonstration in favor of Syria, whose troops had been present 
in the country since the civil war and who were immediately suspected of the 
assassination of Hariri, took place. As a response to this demonstration large 
crowds took to the street on March 14 to condemn the murder of Rafik Hariri, 
calling for the withdrawal of the Syrian troops. This demonstration on March 14 is 
also referred to as the Cedar Revolution. Syrian troops withdrew in April 2005, 
and an international tribunal was established to investigate the assassination of 
Rafik Hariri. (EU 2009; 6) 
The fronts in the 2009 election campaign were most clearly drawn by the political 
blocks of March 14 and March 8
79
. Whereas March 14 represents the 
overwhelming majority of Sunni votes, March 8 equally represents the Shiite 
votes. The Christian votes are more or less equally divided between the two 
coalitions (IFES 2009a).  
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5.3.1 Fixing sovereignty – East or West? 
“…it will be very important for us to keep Lebanon as an independent 
sovereign state and to be able to have no foreign hegemony from any side. 
For us, the role of the resistance and the relationship of the resistance with 
the army and the people is important and so is making Lebanon strong 
enough to stand up and challenge any threat from Israel. (…)” (Qassem, 
May 11 2009) 
“Other factions that worked for Israel80 are now speaking of independence 
and are accusing Hezbollah of working for foreign powers – this is irony 
of history” (Nasrallah, May 15 2009).  
The above quotes are from Sheikh Naim Qassem (Deputy Secretary-General of 
Hezbollah), and Hassan Nasrallah (Secretary-General of Hezbollah). They 
illustrate the definition of „Lebanese sovereignty‟ as one of the primary rhetoric 
battles in the election campaigns, the main threats to which are identified as Syria, 
Iran and Israel. Michel Aoun, as part of March 8 said: “despite the Western wars 
waged on Lebanon‟s territories and the Israeli war waged on Lebanon in 2006 
along with the destruction it entailed, Israel and all those collaborating with it 
were unable to undermine our unity which is becoming stronger every day” 
(Aoun, May 16 2009) March 8 thus clearly identifies Israel as the main threat to 
Lebanese sovereignty. 
 
The Future Movement, as the leading party in the March 14 coalition, in their 
rhetoric was focused on underlining March 8 as armed allies of Syria and Iran, 
“We are a democratic state and nothing should hamper these elections. 
Intimidation campaigns launched by some of Syria‟s friends in Lebanon will not 
scare the Lebanese.” (Hariri, November 27 2008).They also underlined their own 
role as representing Lebanese national unity: “You all know that Rafik Hariri was 
not for one Lebanese party. Upon his martyrdom, all the Lebanese people stood in 
solidarity and rejected this heinous crime, because they all know that Rafik Hariri 
was for all the Lebanese without exception.” (Hariri; February 9 2009). Rafik 
                                                             
80 Referring to the 17th of May Agreement, 1983: The agreement provided for a staged 
withdrawal of Israeli forces, on the condition of the establishment of a Lebanese Army "security 
zone" in South Lebanon along the border area. It contained numerous clauses detailing security 
cooperation between Lebanon and Israel designed to prevent the PLO and other groups from 
infiltrating the border areas. See for example: http://www.lebanese-
forces.org/lebanon/agreements/may17.htm  
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Hariri is thus described as the ultimate Lebanese martyr, and his movement as the 
Lebanese movement.  
The March 14 member Lebanese Forces comment on March 8 as a violent block 
that will not respect the outcome of the election if it does not favor them; “No 
party can hinder the election, but they can employ violence to change the 
results…” and “I am afraid about these parliamentary elections. If the other camp 
does not succeed, it will return to practicing its old habit of using violence as a 
means to change the political reality” (Geagea, November 16 2008); they 
underline the Christians of March 14 as the true Christians in opposition to Syria, 
“There is no doubt that the Christians‟ position on Syria, namely those of them 
who want sovereignty, is a fixed position, and anyone who sympathizes with Syria 
will be burning himself” (Zahra, January 6 2009). 
The Phalange party also spoke of March 8 as a non-Lebanese block, “The 
elections will see a choice between two contradictory political projects: Between 
supporting the state or supporting foreign agendas and the return of guardianship 
(…) we either overcome their continuing coup, or their project will be victorious. 
(…) They aim to replace Beirut with Tehran and Tripoli with Damascus.” 
(Gemayel, February 14 2009).  
This discussion over the foreign allies of either one or the other block is again a 
question of trying to define who the real Lebanese are. What is evident is that a 
real Lebanese would support neither Israel nor Syria. Both blocks refer to the civil 
war, and to questions that have been present since the establishment of the 
Lebanese state: Is Lebanon justified as an independent state, and is the 
sovereignty of Lebanon more important than other issues? Both parties obviously 
argue that it is, and that they are the ones to guarantee Lebanon‟s continued 
independence – whether the threat comes from Israel, Syria or Iran. In short, 
March 8 is the block guaranteeing Lebanon‟s sovereignty from Israeli and 
Western agendas, and March 14 is the block guaranteeing Lebanon‟s sovereignty 
from Syria, Iran and thereby non-Western agendas. This illustrates the old conflict 
of defining Lebanon as a country that is part of Arab Middle-eastern history and 
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culture, or as a country that rather identifies with European and Mediterranean 
history and culture.  
 
5.3.2 Fixing power-sharing – the question of denomination 
Even though there are clear camps and different identities connected to the two 
blocks of March 8 and March 14, they are all part of the sectarian game and play 
by its rules. Here follows an example of how antagonistic identities are being 
subdued by the logic of sectarianism as a solution to conflict, but at the same time 
objectified/made natural by it: the discussion between the two blocks concerning 
„the hindering third‟.  
The so-called thulath al-damin (hindering third) was an important theme in the 
election debate, and basically refers to the opposition‟s right to veto as was agreed 
in Doha 2008. Here, the opposition was granted one-third of the ministerial posts, 
and thereby given the possibility to veto a governmental decision. March 14 did 
not want to continue this practice, while March 8 referred to the „hindering third‟ 
as a principle of the power-sharing system, here Nabih Berri talks of the 
opposition‟s veto right not as a „hindering third‟, but as a „guaranteeing third‟:  
“Regarding the rule following the elections, some are talking about an 
invention called the hindering third which will not allow the situation to 
settle down because each team will try to hinder the work of the other, 
rendering the carriage as one with two drivers each heading in a different 
direction. We would like to say that the guaranteeing third is not an 
invention. We called yesterday in Baalbek and today in Saida for the 
establishment of a government of national participation following the 
elections, because any other government will not be able to govern or will 
be a paralyzed one…” (Berri, May 24 2009) 
Berri is saying that a government will not be able to rule without the 
„guaranteeing third‟, whereas Saad Hariri on the contrary talked about the 
„hindering third‟ in the following way:  
“…last year‟s madness81 was a trap to lead us toward a game of blood and 
civil war in preparation for taking us from the Ta‟if Accord to the Third 
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republic behind which they are concealing the rejected „three-thirds-
republic‟. We are the people of the „two halves‟ in the permanent „two-
halves‟ republic which consecrates coexistence between Muslims and 
Christians regardless of their sizes and numbers.” (Hariri, May 7 2009) 
The assumption behind Hariri‟s statement is that March 8 wants a power-sharing 
based on a Sunni-Shiite-Maronite division in parliament, instead of Muslim-
Christian. This was denied by March 8 several times during the election 
campaign, however they insisted on the opposition‟s continued right to 1/3 of the 
ministerial posts (Aoun May 21 2009, Aoun May 28 2009, Berri 24 May 2009, 
Nasrallah April 1 2009).  
The center of discussion is representation of sect versus that of denomination. 
Sectarianism reveals itself as a hegemonic practice, as the thulath al-damin 
became one of the most central discussions between the two blocks in the election 
campaign. The discussion was a rhetoric battle to fix the definition of power-
sharing, while both were claiming that they were only maintaining status quo. In 
fact, this is exactly the consequence: maintaining the status quo of the logic of 
representation and excluding questions of other logics of representation. 
The otherness of the opposing camp persist, the chains of equivalence (e.g. we, 
Shiite, are poor and are being deprived by the Sunni liberalist camp) are actually 
not broken, but they can only be framed in a very narrow room of political 
contestation which consists of never questioning the power-sharing system. This 
means that the only way to improve the situation for the poor Shiite community 
becomes a question of securing direct influence of Shiite politicians in Parliament; 
it is never a question of a higher degree of economic redistribution in the 
Lebanese society at large. The logic of difference consists in the common 
Lebaneseness, the postulated universal character of both blocks representing all of 
the people. Both blocks accept and refer to this universality for the sake of 
Lebanon, the sanctity of the state institutions. It means that be it economic 
discussions or security and sovereignty it is always framed in a sectarian context 
due to the logic of representation, but at the same time always claimed to be 
universal (Lebanese) not sectarian (particular). This is because the only channel to 
influence in the political system is through the sectarian system, gaining support 
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from an electorate that is already defined in those terms. Further, the meaning of 
sect is played down as it is seen an exception to the „true‟ national unity. 
However, sectarianism is not an exception to the rule, but a ruling exception. 
Contesting this exception means contesting the protection of the power-sharing 
system that guarantees the protection of minorities. Essentially, one cannot 
question the power-sharing system without at the same time implying a) one 
wants to dominate the other minorities or b) one is not in favor of minority rights. 
All parties therefore back „the state institutions‟, though these are the embodiment 
of the sectarianism that all vow to abolish, according to the Ta‟if Agreement.  
This hegemonic logic of difference is not coherent in a logical sense, in the actual 
sense of the word, but it constitutes its own logic where power-sharing and 
sectarianism are seen as two different things. Power-sharing is positive and 
sectarianism is negative. This analysis claims that the two terms are not two 
different things, but that they actually refer to the same thing from two different 
perspectives 1) on one side power-sharing refers to protection of minorities from 
each other (and their foreign allies – most often the foreign allies are referred to as 
it is less controversial than blaming one of the domestic coalitions directly) and 2) 
on the other side sectarianism refers to segregation of communities, because of a 
constant threat of violence between the communities. One can defend one, and 
attack the other and thereby maintain the status quo.  
 
5.3.3 Denomination and the religious subject 
In an election campaign that was largely centered on blaming the others (the 
opposing block), everyone mentioned past conflicts, but few mentioned a conflict 
between Shiite and Sunni explicitly. Nasrallah in a speech on April 1, 2009 quite 
accurately called the system by its name: “Let no one tell us that our current 
system is a democratic and free system like all world democracies, it is not like 
that at all; we have a sectarian system and we have a democracy or elections 
within the framework of sectarian distribution, sectarian rules, and sectarian 
quota whether we like it or not.” (Nasrallah, April 1, 2009) In the discussion 
concerning the hindering third, both Berri and Nasrallah speak of the sectarian 
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system as a potentially dominating structure, if „Muslim‟ is determined by Sunni. 
Especially Hezbollah thereby challenges the logic of power-sharing as a solution 
to conflict, if power-sharing is seen strictly in terms of Muslim-Christian. It is by 
March 8 seen as a cause for conflict if power-sharing does not guarantee the 
influence of Hezbollah and Amal, representing the Shiites (as also the quote by 
Berri suggests, page 69). 
Especially Berri has since 1992 been one of the most prominent advocators for the 
establishment of the commission for abolishment of sectarianism (Daily Star 
14.01, 2010). This can be seen as an effect of the current power-sharing system 
between Muslim and Christian excluding Muslim “minority” identities (e.g. Shiite 
or Druze). The Shiite contestation of the sectarian system is therefore a 
contestation linked to denominational identity. Thereby, this contestation does not 
contest the logic of representation based on the presumption of religious subject. 
For the part of the Shiite, this has from Musa al-Sadr‟s establishment of the 
Movement of the Deprived led to the paradoxical contestations of 1) the sectarian 
system, and insisting on some form of secularization, and of 2) the Muslim-
Christian divide, by insisting on a particular Shiite identity, thus framing the 
political division along denominational lines instead. The latter point must be seen 
as incompatible with a purely secular identity. Therefore, Hezbollah and Amal are 
in the election campaign contesting the sectarian system, but not the essential 
logic of the discourse of sectarianism.  
That there exist processes of identification based on secular ideas in Lebanon, 
contesting both sect and denomination, is exemplified by the Boutros 
Commission, and by the Lebanese blogosphere and CSO activity. 
 
5.4 Examples of a secular identity – revealing the dislocation of 
representation 
In 2006 a campaign against sectarianism put up fake advertisements on 300 
billboards across Beirut: “Parking for Maronites only”, “Cooking lessons by 
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Greek Orthodox”, “Building for sale to Druze”, “Hairstyling by an Armenian 
Catholic”, a fashion agency looking for "a beautiful Shiite face.". At the bottom of 
the billboards it read in Arabic "Citizenship is not sectarianism.", or in English 
“Stop sectarianism before it stops us”. (Qifa Nabki March 4, 2010) The campaign 
was initiated by the civil society group amam05
82
.  
About the campaign amam writes:  
“The campaign focuses on the ridiculous/harmful side of 
sectarianism/confessionalism and its excesses in our everyday life. (…) 
Like us, you think confessionalism is a plague which has been eating away 
at this country for as long as one can remember. Like us, you also think 
this country, despite all its 
flaws and complexities, 
remains a place like no other, 
one we should cherish, support 
& believe in. Like us, you 
have surrendered to the 
Lebanese spell, and have 
vowed to always keep trying, 
in your own way, to make 
things better. Like us, you are 
a believer in the unique 
richness and potential found in 
the Lebanese pluri-
confessional make-up.” 
(Amam05)  
The campaign signalized a strong 
Lebanese national identity, but one that 
tells a different story of Lebanon than the story of the confessional political 
parties. The campaign shows the absurdity of reducing citizens to religious 
subjects by showing how this would look if applied to other spheres of society. 
One Lebanese blogger wrote (My Lebanon is Being Burned to Ashes, June 1, 
2009) before the 2009 election: 
“It is not because there are no candidates I like that I am not voting, I am 
not voting because I do not approve of the whole system (…). I am a 
sunni/armenian orthodox/maronite person. And I don't mind being ruled by 
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red monkeys if those red monkeys care enough to end corruption, help 
create more jobs, improve our education even more and more, work on 
enhancing tourism, ending violence, raising our children not to hate the 
other because the granpa of the granpa of his granpa killed the granpa of 
the granpa of his granpa! I would like them to find a solution for traffic 
(…). I would like to see them clean this country, have optional civil 
marriage, have 2 or 3 days per week that is non-smoking, educate people 
on how to drive (…). But I won't vote.”  
After the election another blogger 
(Lebanon Iznogood
83
):  
“The Lebanese 
Parliament actually 
rarely meets to debate 
and pass laws; it's 
irrelevant, really. All it 
does is represent the 
religious sects. That is 
the function of 
Parliament in 
Lebanon: A 
decorative, rather 
than a functional 
entity. Apparently the Lebanese enjoy knowing that there are so many 
Maronites, Druze, Shiites, etc. standing like dummies in Parliament 
"representing" them.”  
A final example of the secular identity is the Lebanese Laïque Pride Group. The 
group is Face-book based where it has almost 2000 members, and its purpose is to 
organize a “laïque pride parade” on 25th of April 2010. The Laïque Pride as event 
has over 6000 participants registered. The manifest of the Lebanese Laïque Pride 
group is:  
“We are Lebanese citizens seeking to live with dignity, exercise our rights 
and fulfill our duties equally with any other citizen. Empowered by the 
                                                             
83 Lebanon Iznogood aka. Hanibaal writes about himself: “I am a regular Lebanese citizen who 
believes that Lebanon is ripe for a genuine revolution against the religious-feudal-money Mafia. 
The ordinary people of Lebanon should take matters in their own hands and usher their country 
towards a modern democracy where the environment is respected, where the government 
serves the people's everyday needs, and where religion and other stupid beliefs are relegated to 
dusty churches and mosques.” http://lebanoniznogood.blogspot.com/search?updated-
max=2009-10-01T21%3A00%3A00-04%3A00&max-results=50  
 A voter that agrees with the blogger quotes. The home-made ballot-
paper reads: "Shit on you and on these elections. Banana republic. 
Signed: A decent citizen."  
(Source: www.al-akhbar.com/ar/node/140198). 
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rights and the public and private liberties guaranteed by the Lebanese 
Constitution, we demand:  
– the non-interference of religion in State's affairs just like the non-
interference of the State in citizen's religion; 
– the people's representatives' independence from the religious; 
– laws that respect human rights and absolute equality between 
women and men; 
– a Lebanese civil code for personal status; 
– public schooling reinforcement to promote citizenship education; 
– the guarantee of equal employment opportunities on the basis of 
competence in the public sector; 
– an independent judicial power that protects the rights of the citizen 
and prevents him from resorting to his tribal society 
On April 25th 2010, we will be marching for a "Lebanese secularism". We 
will prove that we exist and we will put faces to our demands” (Laïque 
Pride Manifest) 
At the bottom of the Laïque Pride‟s press release was written: “IMPORTANT: 
THIS IS AN INITIATIVE BY AN INDEPENDENT CITIZEN MOVEMENT THAT 
ABSOLUTELY REFUSES TO BE HIJACKED BY POLITICS.”(Laïque Pride press 
release April 16, 2010) 
All four examples include the message of citizenship being something more or 
something else than religious affiliation, and thereby underline the exclusionary 
effect of the current political system. 
The idea of a Laïque Pride Parade is interesting as it draws on the rhetoric of a 
different marginalized identity, namely the homosexual. Showing that secularism 
is not shameful in other words, and giving it a recognizable human face.  
The contribution of the examples of bloggers and civil society initiatives is to 
show that outside of the political establishment it is not difficult to find persons 
who problematize the sectarian Lebanon; for whom the „other‟ is not constituted 
by other religious denominations or sects, but by the politically represented 
religious identity itself. It is this identity that the before mentioned Boutros 
Commission is also representative of.  
These contestations of the sectarian logic of representation reveal the dislocatory 
effect of the sectarian logic of representation as they confront its contingency. 
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None of the contestations deny the possibility of a religious subject position, but 
they deny it as a universal premise for political representation.  
 
5.5. Conclusion – Politics as sectarianism 
Despite the fact that the Ta‟if is often referred to by politicians from all sides 
because it stipulates to abolish sectarianism, no attempts to actually abolish 
sectarianism have been implemented after the civil war. This is partly due to the 
distinguishing between good and bad sectarianism; traditional and modern, 
sectarianism and power-sharing. It has been argued in this analysis that such a 
distinction is not possible, because the concepts refer to the same logic of 
representation.  
The new electoral law as well as the rhetoric during the election campaign was 
referring to the same antagonisms (e.g. Muslim-Christian), and based on the 
historically instituted logic of representation, as it was presented in the first part of 
the analysis. Central political discussions thus became centered on the fixing of 
the floating signifiers of sovereignty and power-sharing, while more concrete 
political programs became less important or completely excluded. This can be 
seen as problematic, e.g. when issues such as poverty become articulated in 
sectarian terms. 
Because the religious subject is never questioned as the primary and objective 
foundation of the political system, the same hegemonic logic is prevailing in the 
political system as before the civil war, before Lebanese independence, and even 
before the establishment of Grand Liban under the French Mandate. The 
discussion concerning Lebanese sovereignty from either East or West illustrates 
the continuity of the battle between a Lebanese Middle-Eastern identity and a 
Lebanese Mediterranean identity. This battle is tied to the pre-war identities of 
Arabism, Islamic Arabism, multi-communal and Christian Lebanism. The 
discussion concerning the definition of power-sharing becomes dominating 
because the political party that wins this discussion and fixes the meaning of 
power-sharing gains the power. The discussion of power-sharing takes on the face 
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of both sectarian and denominational identities, but it never seriously questions 
the sectarian logic of representation. 
The dislocation of the hegemonic logic of representation is revealed by the secular 
contestations reviewed:  
The Boutros Commission in its draft law tries to broaden political contestation by 
developing an electoral framework that encourages inter-sectarian voting and 
seeks to break sectarian block-formation by introducing principles of 
proportionality and enhancing the principle of one person one vote. The campaign 
of Stop sectarianism reveals the dislocation of representation by showing that if 
society looked as it is represented politically it would be characterized by a 
complete segregation of religious communities; an idea that the campaign exhibits 
as absurd. Both the bloggers and the Laïque Pride Group refer to their statements 
as something that is somehow extra-political. By this it is intended that politics is 
implicitly understood to be sectarian politics, and taking part in voting or to be 
involved in politics means to accept the religious subject position as the 
determinant. The rejection of the political system is a rejection of the represented 
identity ascribed, and the frame that is thereby defined for political contestation.  
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6. Conclusion 
Politics have been divided along sectarian lines in Lebanon – and still is. Sectarian 
representations of Lebanon go a long way back in history, but this does not mean 
that they are referring to essential primordial identities – they are political 
identities, and therefore contingent. However, they are firmly institutionalized, 
because the very argument for establishing Lebanon in its current form was based 
on sectarian thinking. 
By applying the method of problematization five different identities were 
identified, each offering its own problematization of Lebanon:  
1. Christian Lebanism problematizes Lebanon as a site of religious conflict and 
sees it as a historically Christian entity that has been arabized against its will. 2. 
Multi-communal Lebanism problematizes Lebanon as a country where all kinds 
of persecuted minorities have sought refuge from pan-Arabism. 3. Arabism 
problematizes Lebanon as a country where Muslims unjustly became second-rate 
to Christians. 4. Islamic Arabism problematizes Lebanon as a country where the 
Islamic identity is in danger of disintegration through threats from Christians and 
in particular Western culture. 5. The Movement of the Deprived problematizes 
Lebanon as a country ruled by the privileged, neglecting the poor; the poor mainly 
being the population of the South, who are mainly Shiite.  
These identities can be seen as based on logic of equivalence in that they all are 
constituted by an antagonism: Christian Lebanism depict the Muslim as the non-
Christian anti-identity.  Muslims are even to a certain degree defined as 
„foreigners‟. Multi-communal Lebanism depicts Pan-Arabism as the anti-identity 
in that it is seen as a homogenizing mono-culture. Arabism sees Christian 
Lebanism as excluding Arab and Muslim identities from Lebanese national 
identity. Islamic Arabism sees secularism as a threat to the unity of the religious 
subject as Islamic - secularism is partly seen as a strategy applied from the 
Christian leaders to corrupt the Muslim identity. The Movement of the Deprived 
opposes the privileged classes, without regard to sectarian belonging, but 
especially links the identity of the deprived to the Shiite community – thereby the 
Christian and the Sunni elites are seen as the anti-identity. 
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The solutions to the issue of political representation which different discursive 
identities‟ offer are all based on the same assumption: that the religious subject 
position is a natural mode of representation of the Lebanese citizen. This 
perceived objectivity of the religious can be seen as logic of difference, and is the 
core logic of the hegemonic discourse of sectarianism. A subversion of this 
objectivity would be a subversion of the sectarian political system.  
Therefore, the Lebanese citizens have been instituted as religious subjects through 
a process where the discursive identity of Christian Lebanism, and the 
problematization of Lebanon that it offered, became the point of departure for 
instituting a sectarian logic of representation. Through a process of iterability, the 
Christian subject through constitutional revisions was modified into the universal 
Lebanese religious subject. This is what still determines the path to political 
power, and why discussions about power-sharing are still dominant in political 
rhetoric. These discussions are battles over the fixing of a crucial floating 
signifier: how to define the religious subject? 
The distinction between power-sharing and sectarianism based on the above 
becomes blurred. Power-sharing implies that there are some objectively defined 
groups between whom power can be shared. However, the distinction between 
modern and traditional sectarianism does not hold; they both represent a modern 
sectarianism based on the sectarian logic of representation.  
The political rhetoric in the election campaign was centered mainly on defining 
power-sharing and sovereignty, and it was a continuation of the same discursive 
battles that had been predominant before the civil war. The long term conflict-
potential of the Lebanese political system therefore remains the same. This is 
because the antagonizing element of simultaneously defining religious, political 
and national identity remains at the core of the political system. The identities 
represented by the current sectarian political parties have become dependent on 
each other to gain a majority in parliament and government, but at the same time 
they are a hindrance to each other in the full achievement of the represented 
identity.  
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That politics have not divided into two clear fronts of Christians on one side and 
Muslims on the other is, according to the ontology of the undecidability of the 
social, explained by the interplay between the logics of equivalence and 
difference: a discourse can never be fully constituted, but at the same time it tries 
to fix meaning in a certain way – this is done through continuing articulations that 
define and redefine meaning.  
That the discourse of sectarianism is hegemonic means that it is not easily 
redefined. It is not static, there are constant battles going on between political 
parties about how to obtain power – but always within the frame of sectarianism. 
A complete subversion of sectarian political identities has proven difficult because 
the language of the religious subject is the frame within which political 
discussions take place and become meaningful as political discussions.  
As was shown in the last chapter there exist contestations of the discourse of 
sectarianism. First of all, abolishing sectarianism is mentioned in the preamble to 
the current constitution. What this means depends on the interpretation of 
sectarianism; the point was made that the ministerial decision establishing the 
Boutros Commission made the distinction between modern and traditional 
sectarianism – thereby proving itself as an internal moment to the discourse of 
sectarianism. The Boutros Commission on the other hand, articulated sectarianism 
as one collected phenomenon that had to be gradually modified through changes 
to the electoral system, and thereby changes to the current mode of representation.  
Outside of the established political sphere different civil society initiatives have 
contested the discourse of sectarianism, and continue to do so. It is significant that 
these contestations declare themselves as completely separate from politics, or 
declare that they under no circumstances are willing to be hijacked by politics. 
This shows that politics in Lebanon by these actors is perceived as synonymous 
with sectarian politics – the very issue that they are opposing. Based on this it can 
be concluded that all discussions taking place within the frame of established 
political institutions will have to declare position in the sectarian game, and 
thereby ascribe to itself a sectarian identity, thus affirming the objectivity of the 
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religious subject. That is how political contestation in Lebanon is set within a very 
limited frame.  
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7. The paper in perspective 
This section briefly discuss 1) the consequences for the paper of the applied 
methodology, and 2) responds to the criticism of 1 by juxtaposing the perception 
of „cultural fragmentation‟ in the theoretical model that is usually used to define 
the political system in Lebanon (consociational democracy) with the perception of 
„antagonism‟ in the theory applied in this paper. 1) Outlines three general 
questions, and 2) seeks to answer them.  
1.  
Laclau‟s and Mouffe‟s discourse theory and social constructivism in general has 
often been criticized of relativism. This critique takes its departure in the notion 
that truth is always internal to a discourse (Howarth 2000; 114); because 
everything is discursive and thereby contingent, there is no center of the social or 
the subject and thereby no universal truths that can be located as the final cause of 
explanation. When it comes to truth and falsity then, are all judgments equally 
valid in discourse theory? In the case of this paper the same criticism could be 
applied: the analysis is basically not able to explain why the political system looks 
as it does, the paper is an account of one discursive formation (discourse of 
sectarianism), from the viewpoint of another (discourse of social constructivism). 
Therefore, it neither provides a model that can be tested and compared, to see if it 
holds, nor can it be an empirical test of a theoretical model applied to the case of 
Lebanon. – So, are there even any criteria of truth and falsity? 
Another often-mentioned problem of Laclau‟s and Mouffe‟s discourse theory is 
that there is an over-emphasis on the ontological level. Insisting on the openness 
of the social (e.g. that there are no pre-constituted social groups defined on the 
ontological level, as would be the case in for example Marxism) leaves open the 
question of how the concepts can be applied empirically (e.g. how to empirically 
distinguish a hegemonic discursive formation from a „normal‟ discursive 
formation?). In many cases the concepts developed by Laclau and Mouffe lack 
thicker supplementary concepts, i.e. concepts that to a higher degree relate to 
empirical analysis. (Howarth 2000; 117) Again, the criticism could be applied to 
this paper: by which scientific method is the logic of sectarianism identified as 
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hegemonic? The description of hegemony is (as in Chapter 3, Theory and 
Methodology) that there are no necessary laws in history, but rather that 
hegemony is based on historically specific rules and conventions that structure the 
production of meaning in particular historical contexts. – While the description of 
discourses is that they are not actually discourses, but partial fixations of meaning, 
so-called nodal points in the field of discursivity. How to empirically delimit one 
from the other, and why focus on ontology making empirical analyses very 
complicated? 
Based on the above criticisms it can be asserted that it is impossible to compare 
different cases, where the analysis is based on Laclau and Mouffe. An analysis of 
the discourse of sectarianism centers on the particular history of Lebanon and the 
particular political system of Lebanon, and it also only concludes on this. - If all 
conclusions relate to internal logics of a discourse and if there is no normative 
evaluation related to more concrete features of the theoretical framework – will 
not all conclusions of an empirical study only be valid for that particular study, 
and not have any significance in other contexts?  
The three questions posed above, concerning Laclau‟s and Mouffe‟s discourse 
theory will be addressed in the following section through a comparison to the 
model of consociational democracy. The questions posed are: What are the 
criteria of truth and falsity? How to use theoretical concepts to categorize 
empirical phenomena, and why focus on ontology? Can the conclusion of the 
particular case be generalized in any way?  
2. 
The parliamentary system in Lebanon is usually categorized as a consociational 
democracy, following Andrew Lijphart (1977). During and after the civil war 
however, it was questionable whether this typology was accurate. It could of 
course be seriously questioned if Lebanon lived up to the criteria of a “fragmented 
but stable” democracy that despite its fragmentation did not exhibit “great 
immobilism and instability”. Further, Lijphart defines one of the distinguishing 
features of a consociational democracy to be the elite behavior; overcoming 
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political instability and mutual tensions, by making “deliberate efforts to 
counteract the immobilizing effects of cultural fragmentation”.  (Lijphart 1977; 1, 
211, 212) Including a comparison of consociational democracy and the applied 
discourse theory is relevant because 1) consociational democracy is often referred 
to and discussed as the model of Lebanese democracy – e.g. does it or does it not 
live up to the criteria of consociational democracy?  And 2) the model of 
consociational democracy, as a specific variant of classic pluralism and thereby a 
more mainstream approach to democratic theory, assumes some of the basic 
structures that this paper, based on Laclau and Mouffe, questions.  
First of all Ljphart defines the model of consociational democracy as both an 
empirical and a normative model that a) explains the political stability of a 
number of small European plural democracies and b) serves a normative model of 
special importance to the plural societies of the Third World (Lijphart 1977; 1-3, 
147-150). The methodology of the model is thus based in the positivist paradigm; 
it is based on an inductively inferred hypothesis that is then subject to a deductive 
method of empirical testing and the conclusions are used to generate a law-like 
explanation (see Chapter 3, Choice of Theory). A basic assumption of the model 
is that the pluralism of societies can be defined by observing the „different 
segments‟ and that these are represented by a certain elite (as described above). It 
is such a basic assumption that the method of retroduction applied in this paper 
seeks to avoid. The criteria of truth and falsity of this paper is, inspired by Glynos 
and Howarth (2007), the same as for most methodologies: reliable evidence and 
internal consistency. However, the criterion of objectivity is modified in that the 
possibility of making empirical observations independently of theory and 
interpretation is rejected, and thereby verification and falsification becomes less 
relevant. (Glynos and Howarth 2007; 190)  
Also, criticizing law-like models in social science does not mean that there are no 
normative assumptions of the theory applied, i.e. that all statements should be 
equal in ethical terms. On the contrary, it means that the theory tries to be explicit 
about the normative content, instead of calling it a natural law. An analysis based 
on Laclau and Mouffe is therefore politicizing (Hansen 2004; 401). A normative 
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criterion could then be that identity should not be perceived as something static, 
and political institutions should be able to somehow accommodate the 
contingency of identities – instead of being based on static features of one or more 
identities. This is particularly important with regard to the assumption that 
antagonism is at the core both of shaping identities and politics; therefore political 
institutions should give room for and accommodate antagonism in abstract terms, 
and not be defined as a representational system of a few particular antagonistic 
identities, be it Christian as opposed to Muslim, or Liberalism as opposed to 
Socialism. This paper therefore agrees with Glynos and Howarth‟s distinction 
between the subject‟s ethical (authentic) and ideological response (inauthentic) to 
a dislocation: the authentic/ethical response of the subject acknowledges the 
radical contingency of social reality; the inauthentic/ideological response of the 
subject denies it. (Glynos and Howarth 2007; 111) What is here called the ethical 
response is in this paper considered the normative criteria for political 
contestation and democratic representation.  
Consociational democracy tends to group together larger segments, e.g. broad 
religious groups, as „interest groups‟ than would be the case in other strands of 
classic pluralism, where it could be e.g. neighborhood organizations. The 
benevolent idea of consociational democracy as a model where “the political 
leaders of all significant segments of the plural society cooperate in a grand 
coalition to govern the country” in contrast to a “government-versus-opposition” 
model (Cunningham 2002; 83, Lijphart 1977; 25), can be problematized by the 
fact that grouping together the identities and interests of these „significant 
segments‟ might seriously oversimplify politics. This is implied by the concept of 
logic of representation. As the analysis has shown the sectarian identity has been 
developed and enforced throughout the history of Lebanon. Equally, the 
development of the sectarian system has continually developed an element of 
conflict as the nexus of the relation between the sectarian identities. The 
parliamentary and electoral system makes the different represented identities 
dependent on each other, while they prevent each other from achieving their full 
identities, respectively. The post-war institutions continue to build on this same 
nexus, thus reproducing the conflict. The basic conflict can continue within the 
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frame of consociational democracy, ironically, because of its goal to 
“accommodate unavoidable conflicts” (Cuningham 2002; 83), and maintain 
stability. From the perspective of Laclau and Mouffe conflict is unavoidable in 
any democratic context, but conflict (or antagonism) is perceived as existing on an 
ontological level, as a premise for all social identity; it is not to be defined in the 
static and narrow sense of Muslims versus Christians, or Sunni versus Shiite. 
Thus, from this point of view consociational democracy is not a sufficient frame 
to analyze the issue of conflicting sectarian identities, because the objectivity of 
the “cultural fragmentation”/antagonism itself is not questioned or investigated; 
only its potential immobilizing effects. Measuring democracy in Lebanon by the 
normative standards of consociational democracy therefore accepts the ruling 
logic of representation, and potentially contributes to continuing the same 
dislocation of representation. Here, the efforts of Laclau and Mouffe towards 
explicitly specifying an ontology based on contingency are essential. By not 
defining theoretical concepts based on context-dependent empirical phenomena 
and then generalizing these features to universal models, Laclau and Mouffe 
leaves the conceptual framework open, so that the “self-interpretations” of social 
actors in the particular context (Glynos and Howarth 2007; 49 pp.) can be 
included as part of the analysis, instead of taking them for granted. The difficulty 
of making empirical categories is then almost a point in itself; science is also just 
a way of partially fixing meaning, it is simply impossible to capture a full 
empirical complexity. Here the method of problematization and the focus on 
articulation become relevant, because (following the method of retroduction) it is 
not the aim of the paper to provide a universal model that explains all features of 
the Lebanese political system. Rather, the question is how the sectarian system is 
accepted as more valid than other political systems. – Could it not have been 
different – and what are the truth claims of this particular system based on? The 
aim therefore becomes to understand the logics inherent to the political system, 
and this is done by first immersing “oneself in a given discursive field consisting 
of texts, documents, interviews and social practices”, and then drawing on 
“theoretical expertise to make particular judgments as to whether something 
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counts as an‟ x‟, and (…) decide upon its overall importance for the problem 
investigated” (Glynos and Howarth 2007; 184). 
Given this method of problematization, the focus on context-dependent self-
interpretation and on articulations in a specific context, will not all conclusions of 
an empirical study only be valid for that particular study, and not have any 
significance in other contexts? Ussama Makdisi notes in the introduction to his 
book that discourses of sectarianism are local but as phenomenon not only locally 
relevant: “Sectarianism is a modern story, and, for those intimately involved in its 
unfolding, it is the modern story – a story that has and that continues to define 
and dominate their lives. Although this book records a history that transpires in 
rural Mount Lebanon, it has many parallels in Ayodhya, Kosovo and Belfast. It is 
all about location in a modern world where the margins can become centers” 
(Makdisi 2000; 3). 
This is relevant in the discussion of post-structuralist theories as ones that do not 
generate theoretical models to predict the cause of events by establishing a certain 
causal relation. The above examples of cases comparable to the analysis of the 
discourse of sectarianism in Lebanon is not to say that there is one cause which 
always triggers a certain type of conflict, or that conflict always causes a certain 
type of political system. 
Rather, it is to say that there are certain processes in the formation of social 
identities that are relevant across contexts; be it Europe, Asia or the Middle East. 
However, it is only through investigating the particular context that these 
processes can be analyzed, and contribute to a deeper and more nuanced 
understanding of the case or conflict at hand. And this understanding again adds 
to the understanding of the interplay between politics and identity. (Glynos and 
Howarth 2007; 206-207)  
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Appendix A 
 
Denominations 
There has been no official census since 1932 therefore there is no accurate account of 
the national resident population. However, there is an account of registered voters. All 
voters are registered as member of a religious group, and each Lebanese is born into a 
religious group.  
In Lebanon 11 religious communities are represented in Parliament. In all there are 17 
legally recognized and institutionalized communities in Lebanon, additionally 2 
communities are legally recognized but not institutionalized (i.e. Ismaelite and Secular). 
The 11 communities represented in Parliament: 
5 Muslim (59,5% of total registered voter population): Shiite, Sunni, Druze, Alawite 
6 Christian (39,9% of total registered voter population): Maronite, Greek-orthodox, 
Greek-catholic, Armenian-orthodox, Armenian-catholic. The last is 1 Minority and 
includes the remaining 6 Christian communities: Chaldean, Nestorian, Syriac, Jocobites, 
Latin, Protestant, and Copt. 
Thereby the quota in parliament excludes the 3 following recognized communities from 
being candidates for parliament: 
Ismaelite (Muslim), Jewish, and Secular.  
The most numerous communities (in terms of share of total registered voter population) 
are Sunni Muslims (26,8%), Shiite Muslims (26,3%), Maronite Christians (21,8%), Greek-
orthodox (7,7%) Druses (5,6%), and Greek-Catholic (5,1%). 
 
(EU 2005, DRI and LADE 2008, IFES 2009a) 
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Appendix B 
 
The parties who entered Parliament in 2009 
 
March 14: 
Future Movement (24 Deputies) – 
Sunni 
Lebanese Forces (5 Deputies) – 
Christian 
Phalange Party (5 Deputies) – 
Christian 
Progressive Socialist Party (4 
deputies) - Druze 
Democratic Left (1 Deputy) - Shiite 
Ramgavar (1 Deputy) - Armenian 
Jamaa Al-Islamiya (1 Deputy) - 
Sunni 
March 14 affiliated independents: 
30 deputies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
March 8: 
Amal Movement (12 deputies) – Shiite 
Free Patritic Movement (10 Deputies) – Christian  
Hezbollah (10 Deputies) – Shiite 
Tashnags (2 Deputies) – Armenian 
Marada (1 Deputy) – Christian  
Syrian Social Nationalist Party (2 Deputies) - 
Secular 
Islamic Action (1 Deputy) - Sunni 
Lebanese Democratic Party (1 Deputy) – Druze 
Baathists (2 deputies) - Secular 
March 8 affiliated independents: 16 deputies 
 
(IFES 2009a, nowlebanon.com) 
(Though the Baathists and the SSNP are secular 
parties, their candidates are still elected 
according to the sectarian and denominational 
quota in Parliament; if they were either Jewish, 
Ismaelite or registered secular there would be no 
seat for them in parliament)
 
